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INTRODUCTION
For about a quarter of the huge number of people behind bars in the United
States at any given time, the government’s justification for incarceration is not punishment for crime. 1 Rather, our federal, state, and local governments lock up a hundreds of thousands of people at a time—millions over the course of a year 2—to ensure their appearance at a pending criminal or immigration proceeding. This type of
pretrial incarceration—a term we use to cover both pretrial criminal detention and
immigration detention prior to finalization of a removal order—can be very harmful.

1 The most recent data published by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics—in the middle of the
COVID pandemic, which significantly slowed new incarceration—tallied 1,691,600 people in jail and
prison (1,215,800 in prison, 549,100in jail). RICH KLUCKOW & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2020 – STATISTICAL TABLES
(Mar. 2022), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus20st.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNG4-KLKJ] Of the
individuals in jail (which excludes jail-equivalents in states with consolidated prison/jail systems),
nearly 70% (380,700) were unconvicted, “awaiting court action on a current charge or held in jail for
other reasons.” ZHEN ZENG & TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES IN 2020–STATISTICAL TABLES (Dec. 2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji20st.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K9S-C4WA]. Thousands more immigrants are incarcerated
awaiting immigration adjudication or deportation (though more precise data are scarce). See Donald
Kerwin with Daniela Alulema & Siqi Tu, Piecing Together the US Immigrant Detention Puzzle One
Night at a Time: An Analysis of All Persons in DHS-ICE Custody on September 22, 2012, 3 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 330, 330 (2015) (about half of detained immigrants in 2012 had pending
removal cases). We took data disclosed in response to FOIA litigation, ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 1:19-cv-07058-GBD (S.D.N.Y.), and tallied the divide on March
15, 2020; of 36,794 detained immigrants, over 60% were awaiting their removal proceedings. Data
posted at Resources, Margo Schlanger, Univ. Mich, L. (2022) https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/Resources.aspx [https://perma.cc/5GCB-L6QB].
2 RAM SUBRAMANIAN, RUTH DELANEY, STEPHEN ROBERTS, NANCY FISHMAN & PEGGY MCGARRY,
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 46
(2015).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4205817

2020]

Ending the Discriminatory Pretrial Incarceration of People
with Disabilities

3

It disrupts the work and family lives of those detained, 3 harms their health, 4 interferes with their defense, 5 and imposes pressure on them to forego their trial rights
and accede to the government’s charges in an effort to abbreviate time behind bars. 6
For people with disabilities, however, pretrial incarceration is often even worse; it
can utterly destabilize their physical and mental health and devastate their ability to
participate in their proceedings. Set aside whether that would be a justifiable imposition if pretrial incarceration were truly necessary for the criminal or immigration
systems to process their cases or if it truly served public safety. We demonstrate in
this article that existing antidiscrimination law demands alternatives to pretrial incarceration, when it is demonstrably unnecessary and undermines the equal access
of people with disabilities to the criminal or immigration processes that purport to
justify it. The argument is somewhat novel, but founded firmly on existing law: the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, their
regulations, and well-developed interpretive case law.
We proceed as follows: In Part I, we explain how people in pretrial incarceration
are disadvantaged in their access to justice because of their disabilities. In Part II,
we establish that the criminal and immigration legal systems are covered by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, which mandate that people with disabilities receive
“meaningful access” 7 to government operations, including when providing such access requires reasonable modifications of ordinarily applicable policies and procedures. We set out the statutory, regulatory, and case law parameters for determining
whether a proposed modification to defendant practices constitutes a “reasonable
modification” required by statute, or a “fundamental alteration” not so required. And
we analyze the issue of causation, explaining what it means for deprivations to be
“by reason of . . . disability.” Part III applies the law, demonstrating that providing
alternatives to pretrial incarceration would constitute a reasonable modification to,
not a fundamental alteration of, the underlying criminal/immigration processing systems. It also analyzes the differences between our proposals and two quite different
disability-related interventions—competency restoration and the appointment of
counsel. Part IV examines several specific counterarguments that government defendants might offer. For individuals facing state criminal charges, we suggest that

Id.; see also Nick Petersen, Do Detainees Plead Guilty Faster? A Survival Analysis of Pretrial
Detention and the Timing of Guilty Pleas, 31 CRIM. JUST. POL. REV. 1015, 1017–18 (2019); Samuel R.
Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1356–57 (2013);
Samantha Artiga & Barbara Lyons, Family Consequences of Detention/Deportation Effects on Finances, Health, and Well-Being, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.kff.org/racialequity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/family-consequences-of-detention-deportation-effects-on-finances-health-and-well-being/ [https://perma.cc/2RGK-66MG].
4 See Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2151–
52 (2017); U.S. Comm’n on C.R., With Liberty and Justice for All: The State of Civil Rights at Immigration Detention Facilities 32–36 (2015); Andrew P. Wilmer, Steffie Woolhandler, J. Wesley Boyd,
Karen E. Lasser, Danny McCormick, David H. Bor & David U. Himmelstein, MD., Health and Health
Care of U.S. Prisoners: Results of a Nationwide Survey, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 666 (2009); Joanne
Csete, Consequences of Injustice: Pre-Trial Detention and Health, 6 INT’L J. OF PRISONER HEALTH 3
(2010).
5 See Johanna Kalb, Gideon Incarcerated: Access to Counsel in Pretrial Detention, 9 U.C. IRVINE
L. Rev. 101, 121–28 (2018); Wiseman, supra note 3, at 1355; Marouf, supra note 4, at 2150–51.
6 Petersen, supra note 3, at 1017–18 (2019); Wiseman, supra note 3, at 1356; Marouf, supra note
4, at 2151, 2151 n.57.
7 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
3
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Younger abstention poses no obstacle to ADA/Rehabilitation Act enforcement under
our theory. For individuals in immigration detention, we rebut, seriatim, several
counterarguments: we show that our proffered interpretation of the Rehabilitation
Act is consistent with so-called “mandatory detention” Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) provisions, and we address several INA jurisdiction-stripping provisions.
This is all very lawyerly. But we want to begin by emphasizing the human stakes
for persons such as John Doe, a client of one of the authors. 8 Mr. Doe is an asylum
seeker from El Salvador. Like many trauma survivors, he self-medicated with alcohol to deal with his pain, and like many poor people of color in the United States, he
came into contact with law enforcement and was arrested on a criminal charge. After
a 65-day stint in criminal custody, he was transferred to immigration detention. ICE
continued to incarcerate him for four years. During this time, his immigration case
repeatedly bounced back and forth between the dockets of several immigration
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, which remanded his case on three
separate occasions for various legal errors. 9
These four years changed Mr. Doe. He entered ICE custody with undiagnosed
post-traumatic stress disorder. His mental health so deteriorated during his years of
incarceration that he ultimately developed major depressive disorder with psychotic
features. 10 Initially, Mr. Doe was able to work over the phone and in person with his
immigration attorney to answer questions about his past and prepare a declaration.
But eventually he could manage to communicate regarding traumatic events only in
writing. 11 At times, he became unable to communicate at all.12 He also attempted
suicide on at least three occasions while in ICE custody. 13 A psychological evaluator
determined that Mr. Doe had reached the very “edge of his capacity to emotionally
cope with his current situation.” 14
ICE’s incarceration of Mr. Doe not only jeopardized his well-being, it also
threatened his ability to vindicate his immigration rights. On April 6, 2020, Mr. Doe
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking his release from immigration custody in part as a reasonable accommodation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Around one month later, a federal district court ordered his release
from custody. 15 The district court never ruled on the Rehabilitation Act claim, but
once Mr. Doe left detention and received appropriate treatment in a therapeutic setting, his mental health improved, and he was again able to work with his attorney on
his immigration case. In August 2021, Mr. Doe finally won relief at his fourth immigration court hearing, ending his years-long immigration proceedings. 16
John Doe is one of the lucky ones, because he had a lawyer, because he was
released, and because—having been released—he was better able to vindicate his
8 Mr. Doe uses a pseudonym to protect his privacy. Temporary Restraining Order, Doe v. Barr,
No. 1:20-cv-02263-RMI (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2020), 2020 WL 1984266 [hereinafter Doe v. Barr TRO];
Preliminary Injunction Order, Doe v. Barr, No. 20-cv-02263-RMI (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2020), 2020 WL
3639649 [hereinafter Doe v. Barr PI Order].
9 Doe v. Barr TRO, at *2; Doe v. Barr PI Order, at *3.
10 Doe v. Barr TRO, at *3; Doe v. Barr PI Order, at *4.
11 Records are on file with the authors.
12 Doe v. Barr TRO, at *3.
13 Id.; Doe v. Barr PI Order, at *4.
14 Doe v. Barr TRO, at *3; Doe v. Barr PI Order, at *10.
15 Doe v. Barr TRO, at *1, *14.
16 Records on file with the authors.
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immigration rights and beat deportation. When pretrial incarceration undermines the
ability of people with disabilities to participate in their criminal or immigration trials, their disabilities can cause grievous long-term disadvantage—often imprisonment or deportation. We write this article with the certainty that there are many people like Mr. Doe who have been and will continue to be unlawfully deported or
imprisoned, absent the intervention of disability law. The argument we outline below offers a path for people with disabilities and legal practitioners to seek release
from incarceration in order to obtain equality of opportunity in their judicial proceedings. 17
I. HOW PRETRIAL INCARCERATION UNDERMINES EQUAL COURT ACCESS
FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Some brief background on the types of institutions in which pretrial incarceration takes place may be useful context for the argument. In state criminal systems,
people facing charges may be incarcerated pending granting of bond or, if they don’t
receive or can’t make their bond, pending trial. They are usually held in city and
county jails, but a few states with unified jail/prison systems 18 incarcerate them in
state facilities. 19 Analogous defendants in the federal criminal system are housed in
either federal jails 20 or in city or county jails under a federal contract. 21 During immigration court proceedings, the federal government may detain people it seeks to
deport in federal contract facilities devoted in part or entirely to immigration detention or in city or county jails under federal contract. 22 Some are there because they
cannot make or are not granted bond; others are deemed statutorily ineligible for
bond because of their criminal history. 23
Pretrial incarceration obstructs court access for people with disabilities in a variety of ways beyond the experience of non-disabled people. Incarceration can interfere with detained peoples’ physical access to court buildings. And even though lawyers are particularly important for people with disabilities, incarceration undermines
their efforts to locate and retain an attorney, as well as their communication with
lawyers they manage to retain and with court officials. For the large majority forced

Because we are analyzing equal access to the program of criminal/immigration adjudication,
our argument does not apply to post-judgment incarceration. Disability antidiscrimination law certainly
covers non-pretrial incarceration, and there may be viable decarcerative arguments in particular circumstances, but they are not our topic here.
18 Six states have unified systems: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and
Vermont. See NAT’L INST. CORR., STATE STATISTICS INFORMATION, https://nicic.gov/projects/state-statistics-information [https://perma.cc/L4FS-M8GS]. For background, see NAT’L INST. CORR., A REVIEW
OF THE JAIL FUNCTION WITHIN STATE UNIFIED CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS (Sept. 1997),
https://nicic.gov/sites/default/files/014024.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GUM-C4CF].
19 See sources cited supra note 1.
20 Federal jails are denoted “Metropolitan Correctional Centers,” “Metropolitan Detention Centers,” or “Federal Detention Centers.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7331.04: PRETRIAL INMATES 3 (2003), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/7331_004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QYR7-MRQU].
21 Defendant and Prisoner Custody and Detention, U.S. MARSHALS SERV. (June 30, 2022)
https://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/detention.htm [https://perma.cc/9EJZ-PJCK].
22 See Detention Facilities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (2022), https://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/V8YB-XVXS].
23 See infra Section III.D.
17
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to move forward without an attorney, incarceration places often insurmountable obstacles to locating and speaking with potential witnesses, obtaining evidence, and
conducting legal research. Equally important, incarceration can exacerbate people’s
disabilities, separating them from necessary treatment and undermining their disability-related coping strategies, rendering them too sick or injured to manage their
court cases, cooperate with their counsel, or participate in their hearings. In the
worst-case scenario, it can kill them, which obviously has the corollary effect of
depriving them of the opportunity to fight their cases.
These kinds of effects are run-of-the-mill consequences of carceral conditions
for people with disabilities. Across the United States, the agencies operating jails,
prisons, and immigration detention centers frequently fail to implement basic disability accessibility measures. 24 Securing equipment needed for safety, mobility, and
communication—hearing aids, eyeglasses, canes, special shoes, crutches, wheelchairs, etc.—often requires aggressive advocacy and is never guaranteed.25 Incarcerated people are regularly denied access to needed medication. The conditions of
custody also make it more challenging for people with disabilities to self-accommodate. Zoe Brennan-Krohn, staff attorney at the ACLU Disability Rights Project, explains that many people with disabilities need stability and control over their own
routines to self-accommodate and live fully with their disabilities.26 The lack of adequate accommodations and treatment can be devastatingly destructive. Each of this
article’s authors knows this from up-close observation, and the interviews, reports,
and other written sources cited in this section confirm those experiences.
There are infinite permutations in how pretrial incarceration undermines equal
access to court proceedings for people with disabilities. Below, we overview some
frequent consequences of incarceration on the lives of people with physical disabilities, visual and auditory disabilities, intellectual and psychiatric disabilities, and
people with chronic illnesses.

See, e.g., Rachel Seevers, Making Hard Time Harder: Programmatic Accommodations for Inmates with Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, DISABILITY RIGHTS WASH. (Jun. 22,
2016), https://www.disabilityrightswa.org/making-hard-time-harder-programmatic-accommodationsinmates-disabilities-americans-disabilities-act/print/ [https://perma.cc/98ZT-MDZ7]
25 For examples of prison/jail denials of mobility aids, see Complaint, Cardew v. N.Y. Dep’t of
Corr. and Cmty. Supervision, No. 6:21-cv-06557 (W.D.N.Y. 2021), http://clearinghouse.net/doc/112486 [https://perma.cc/KMY4-MVNX] (class action lawsuit against New York Department of Corrections for denying mobility aids and providing broken and unusable shared wheelchairs); Complaint, Terrill v. Oregon, No. 6:21-cv-00588-AA (D. Or. 2021), http://clearinghouse.net/doc/112037 [https://perma.cc/Y459-AYMX] (class action lawsuit against Oregon Department of Corrections for denying durable medical equipment to persons with disabilities who lack funds
to pay for the device); DISABILITY RTS. CAL., REPORT ON THE INSPECTION OF THE SACRAMENTO COUNTY
JAIL (CONDUCTED APRIL 13–14, 2015) 19 (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/702701.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S37-UEX6] (jail-issued wheelchairs lack
brakes); DISABILITY RIGHTS CALIFORNIA, REPORT ON INSPECTION OF THE SANTA BARBARA COUNTY JAIL
(Conducted April 2, 2015) (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/publications/report-oninspection-of-the-santa-barbara-county-jail [https://perma. cc/KKZ7-2PAN] (jail-issued wheelchair
has faulty brakes); Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion, Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 261 F.R.D. 173,
No. 94-cv-2307 CW (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010)
(California department of corrections found to confiscate medically prescribed assistive devices).
26 Zoom Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Zoe Brennan-Krohn, Staff Att’y at Disability Rts.
Program, Am. C.L. Union (Jan. 26, 2022).
24
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A. Physical Disabilities
Incarceration disadvantages people with physical disabilities in their judicial
proceedings in many ways. Perhaps most common is that it limits their ability to
meet with counsel or attend court hearings. Corene Kendrick, Deputy Director of
the ACLU National Prison Project, recounts a situation when the single accessible
vehicle at one prison broke down; correctional officers directed prisoners with ambulatory disabilities to either find a way to get into an inaccessible vehicle or delay
their court hearings. 27 Similarly, ICE both denied any ambulatory aids to Emanuel
Thiersaint, a detained immigrant with an amputated leg, and refused to help him get
in and out of inaccessible vans and airplanes the government used to transport him
between detention facilities and court hearings. 28 Another form of disadvantage accrues when the inaccessible features of carceral environments 29 injure people with
physical disabilities; obviously this is problematic in itself, but it also limits their
ability to meet with counsel or attend court hearings. Mr. Thiersaint was injured on
multiple occasions by ICE’s refusal to provide assistance; at least once, he was
forced to soil himself. 30 The trauma of his discrimination compromised Mr. Thiersaint’s ability to think about his immigration case, much less communicate with an
attorney about exactly what was happening to him. It was not until after he was
released from ICE incarceration and received years of quality medical and mental
health care that he was able to tell his lawyer (one of the authors) the details of all
that ICE had forced him to endure. Similarly, another one of an author’s clients had
limited mobility and suffered from a urinary infection in immigration detention. Ultimately, he spent several weeks in a hospital where he had no access to a telephone
for attorney calls and could not receive visitors of any kind. The government also
rescheduled a court hearing during the period of the client’s hospitalization, prolonging the duration of his incarceration.
In addition, the incomplete accommodations that are sometimes offered can
themselves be extremely unequal. Consider, for example, the case of Manuel Amaya
Portillo, 31 who came to the United States seeking asylum based on the persecution
and harms he faced in Honduras due to his physical disabilities.32 Mr. Portillo was
born with a congenital condition that stunted his height and the formation of his legs
and hands. Because he was incarcerated, the first step of his asylum process took
place over the telephone, which meant that the asylum officer could not see the ways
in which his disabilities make him a target for persecution; they therefore deemed
his request for asylum not credible. ICE continued to incarcerate Mr. Portillo under
Zoom Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Corene Kendrick, Deputy Dir., Nat’l Prison Project, Am. C.L. Union (Jan. 7, 2021).
28 Complaint, Emanuel Thiersaint v. DHS, No. 1:18-cv-12406-PBS (D. Mass 2018), at 1, 8–18.
29 See, e.g., JAMELIA MORGAN, AM. C.L. UNION, CAGED IN: THE DEVASTATING HARMS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON PRISONERS WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/010916-aclu-solitarydisabilityreport-single.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XL265U8J].
30 Complaint, supra note 28, at 11.
31 Letter from Rachel L. Chappell, Att’y, Rozas & Rozas LLC, Eunice Cho, Senior Staff Att’y,
Am. C.L. Union Nat’l Prison Project, & Katie Schwartzmann, Director, Am. C.L. Union La., to Deportation Officer Robert Gentry, Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.laaclu.org/sites/
default/files/field_documents/2020-01-08_amaya_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8FP-77NN].
32 Id.; Zoom Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Eunice Cho, Senior Staff Att’y at Nat’l Prison
Project, Am. C.L. Union (Jan. 7, 2021).
27
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imminent threat of deportation for months, until lawyers, including attorneys with
the American Civil Liberties Union, successfully intervened. Mr. Portillo’s legal
team advocated for him to appear before immigration officials over a video call, to
make it possible for immigration officials to see the reality of his congenital condition. 33 Ultimately, in response to the request, immigration officials decided to find
him credible without an additional interview, stopping Mr. Portillo’s imminent deportation. Mr. Portillo’s story is far from unique. Even represented individuals in
pretrial incarceration may be sharply disadvantaged by it, because of their disability.
And Mr. Portillo’s pre-representation loss underscores the even greater disadvantage
to incarcerated persons with physical disabilities who are forced to manage their
own proceedings without help from advocates.

B. Chronic Illnesses
The lack of adequate medical care provided by carceral facilities can be especially dangerous for people with chronic illnesses that require regular medical treatment. Deteriorating health often makes it far harder for individuals in pretrial incarceration to focus on or participate in their criminal or immigration cases. If worse
comes to worst, their death is the ultimate bar to meaningful access to their court
proceedings. 34
This set of issues may affect many people, because the prevalence of chronic
illness among incarcerated people is very high. In one key survey, the Department
of Justice found that nearly 45% of people incarcerated in jail reported having been
diagnosed with a (listed) chronic illness and 14% with a serious infectious disease,
compared to 27% and 5% in non-incarcerated population 35:

Zoom Interview with Eunice Cho, supra note 32.
See, e.g., Michael Barajas, When Asthma in Jail Becomes a Death Sentence, TEXAS OBSERVER
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.texasobserver.org/when-asthma-in-jail-becomes-a-death-sentence/
[https://perma.cc/FVT4-36FZ].
35 LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, MARCUS BERZOFSKY & JENNIFER UNANGST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–
12 (2015), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpsfpji1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8AV-N4HA]. Nonincarcerated population estimates were standardized to match the jail population by sex, age, race, and
Hispanic origin. See also Margo Schlanger, Prisoners with Disabilities, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 295 (Erik Luna, ed., 2017).
33
34
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TABLE 1: SELF-REPORTED CHRONIC ILLNESSES IN JAIL
COMPARED TO NON-INCARCERATED POPULATIONS (DOJ, 2016)

Ever had a chronic condition
Cancer
High blood pressure/hypertension
Stroke-related problems
Diabetes/high blood sugar
Heart-related problems
Kidney-related problems
Arthritis/rheumatism
Asthma
Cirrhosis of the liver
Ever had an infectious disease
Tuberculosis
Hepatitis
Hepatitis B
Hepatitis C
STDs
HIV/AIDS

Jail (%)
44.7
3.6
26.3
2.3
7.2
10.4
6.7
12.9
20.1
1.7
14.3
2.5
6.5
1.7
5.6
6.1
1.3

Non-incarcerated (%)
26.9
13.9
0.5
4.5
1.9

11.4
0.1
4.6
0.4
0.9

3.5
0.3

The consequences of medical neglect can be extremely dangerous. For example,
an unfortunate body of case law demonstrates the difficulties faced by incarcerated
people with diabetes, who may experience life-threatening symptoms and even die
as a result of medical neglect in jail or prison. 36 Similarly, asthma someone keeps
under control on the outside can become life threatening during a jail or prison
stint, 37 because incarceration is accompanied by indoor allergens, exposure to infection, and poor access to on-demand devices like inhalers. 38 Immigration detention,
36 For a sampling of cases in which plaintiffs with diabetes alleged or proved grave deterioration
because of medical neglect behind bars, see Chapman v. Santini, 805 F. App'x 548 (10th Cir. 2020);
Anders v. Bucks Cnty., 2014 WL 1924114, at *22 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d
523, 532 (7th Cir. 2011); Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 2008); Flowers v. Bennett, 123 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (N.D. Ala. 2000); Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 646–47 (8th
Cir. 1999); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 849–50 (2d Cir. 1996).
37 See, e.g., Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1539–41 (11th Cir. 1995) (describing how a “lifelong
asthma sufferer” died of acute respiratory failure within a month of being incarcerated in a state prison);
Hagan v. Cal. Forensic Med. Grp., No. 07-cv=1095 LKK/DAD, 2009 WL 728465, at *1–*2 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2009) (explaining how an inmate died “from complications relating to severe asthma shortly
after being transferred” from a county jail to state prison).
38 Dale L. Morse, Morris A. Gordon, Thomas Matte & Gordon Eadie, An Outbreak of Histoplasmosis in a Prison, 122 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 253 (1985); Charles W. Hoge, Mary R. Reichler,
Edward A. Dominguez, John C. Bremer, Timothy D. Mastro, Katherine A. Hendricks, Daniel M.
Musher, John A. Elliott, Richard R. Facklam & Robert F. Breiman, An Epidemic of Pneumococcal
Disease in an Overcrowded, Inadequately Ventilated Jail, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 643 (1994); Hernandez v. Cnty. of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 951–52, 952 nn.169–70 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (describing
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too, creates risks to people with chronic illnesses because of those illnesses. 39 The
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic underscores the point, for all kinds of incarceration.
Comorbidities combined with dangerous incarcerative conditions have led to raging
disease in carceral facilities. While COVID infection rates and mortality in carceral
facilities did not approach the devastating levels seen in nursing homes, 40 both have
been far higher than in the community: infections among incarcerated people have
been over five times the nonimprisoned rate; mortality rates have been triple the
nonimprisoned rate. 41 Not every illness raises the claim this article explores. But
where pretrial incarceration exacerbates chronic illness and concomitantly interferes
with access to criminal or immigration proceedings, release is not merely humane
but may be required by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s guarantee of meaningful
access to government programs.

C. Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
For people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, pretrial incarceration may undermine equal access to court proceedings by disrupting their lives in
ways they cannot manage. Carceral environments run on a set of inflexible rules that
incarcerated people cannot control or change. The ability to comprehend or follow
those rules is especially challenging for people with cognitive disabilities and can

the “significant evidence” provided by the plaintiffs that “inmates suffering from hyperternsion and
asthma did not get their community prescriptions timely continued”); Olson v. Sherburne Cnty., No.
07-cv-4757JNE/JJG, 2009 WL 1766619, at *3 (D. Minn. June 22, 2009) (explaining how an inmate
went into “respiratory failure triggered by allergens in his jail cell and inability to receive timely medical care”).
39 See, e.g., Temporary Restraining Order, Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL
5074312, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020) (describing how a non-citizen from Mexico fell into a diabetic coma after roughly four months in immigration custody). See generally AM. C.L. UNION, DET.
WATCH NETWORK & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., FATAL NEGLECT: HOW ICE IGNORES DEATHS IN
DETENTION (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/fatal_neglect_acludwnnijc.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9CT-EKZ2].
40 In the United States, nursing home residents have been forty-five times more likely to die of
COVID-19 than the general population. See COVID-19 Nursing Home Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 28, 2021), https://data.cms.gov/covid-19/covid-19-nursing-home-data
[https://perma.cc/5WSP-E7C8] (reporting 140,794 total COVID-19 deaths among nursing home residents); Total Number of Residents in Certified Nursing Facilities, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2022),
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/number-of-nursing-facility-residents/
[https://perma.cc/8K4J-FDSX] (1,290,177 residents in certified nursing facilities in the U.S. in 2020)
and COVID Data Tracker Weekly Review, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 10,
2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/index.html#more-info
[https://perma.cc/R4JC-CMAQ] (790,766 total COVID-19 deaths in the United States), QuickFacts,
CENSUS
BUREAU
(2021)
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US#
U.S.
[https://perma.cc/7DDX-FL76] (estimating U.S. population at 328,239,523 as of July 1, 2019). As of
November 25, 2020, “deaths in long-term care facilities account[ed] for 40% of all COVID-19 deaths”
nationwide. Priya Chidambaram, Rachel Garfield & Tricia Neuman, COVID-19 Has Claimed the Lives
of 100,000 Long-Term Care Residents and Staff, KFF (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policywatch/covid-19-has-claimed-the-lives-of-100000-long-term-care-residents-and-staff/
[https://perma.cc/6EQ6-EY8B].
41 See Brendan Saloner, Kalind Parish, & Julie A. Ward, COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal
and State Prisons, 324 JAMA 602 (2020) (making both findings; mortality figures are after adjusting
for age and sex distributions).
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impede their ability to access their court proceedings. 42 Disability rights attorney
Pilar Gonzalez Morales reports, for example, that she has numerous clients with intellectual disabilities who have had trouble understanding the jail or detention facility’s schedule of times that phones are available for clients to call their attorneys. 43
People with developmental disabilities often have specific sensory needs that go
unmet in a carceral environment. Gonzalez Morales recalls a specific client with
autism whom a jail frequently punished for not standing up for a daily stand-up
count, during which every detained person was required to recite his name and inmate number. The client found compliance very difficult: sometimes he was distracted by his (disability-related) need to compulsively and repeatedly wash his
hands; sometimes various sensory distractions frustrated him; sometimes he would
be rehearsing something in his mind at count time and was unable to put it aside and
follow orders. His noncompliance often led to physical confrontations by jail guards,
who did not understand that touching him was still more triggering to his autism.
Gonzalez Morales recounts how it was difficult for her to focus on legal issues in
the client’s case because his incarceration created a whole set of emergency situations. She also explains that it was hard to do what the client wanted, because the
client was constantly in a state of trauma response that compromised his ability to
articulate his longer-term needs. The client was put into isolation several times as a
result of these conflicts, where she could not reach him due to restricted phone access and rules prohibiting in-person visits, even by attorneys. 44

D. Psychiatric Disabilities
For people with psychiatric disabilities, the way incarceration undermines court
access is a little different. The most basic issue is that, for people with mental illness,
pretrial incarceration may subvert its own purpose (facilitating court proceedings)
by worsening their mental health to the point that they are no longer able to participate equally in their own criminal or immigration defense.
Common conditions of incarceration exacerbate mental health conditions. 45 For
example, studies demonstrate that exacerbation of psychotic symptoms is predicted
42 Chiara Eisner, Prison Is Even Worse When You Have a Disability Like Autism, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/11/02/prison-is-even-worse-whenyou-have-a-disability-like-autism [https://perma.cc/5P9S-YLCZ].
43 Telephone Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Pilar Gonzalez Morales, Dir. of Accessibility
Project, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (Dec. 2, 2021).
44 Id. Along similar lines, consider the case of Reginald Latson, described in detail in Jasmine E.
Harris, Reckoning with Race and Disability, 130 YALE L.J. F. 916 (2021), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/reckoning-with-race-and-disability [https://perma.cc/EVP6-SZH4].
45 Xavier Becerra, The California Department of Justice’s Review of Immigration Detention in
California, CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Feb., 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/immigration-detention-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYR9-3L5V]; Staff of Subcomm. on C.R. & C.L, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong., THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S
MISTREATMENT OF DETAINED IMMIGRANTS: DEATHS AND DEFICIENT MEDICAL CARE BY FOR-PROFIT DETENTION CONTRACTORS (2020), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
2020-09-24.%20Staff%20Report%20on%20ICE%20Contractors.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6NTE4RY]; CARLTON I. MANN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. MANAGEMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH CASES
IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (OIG-11-62) (2011), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-62_Mar11.pdf [https://perma.cc/G24L-SCFX]; JOHN ROTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE STILL STRUGGLES TO HIRE AND RETAIN STAFF FOR MENTAL HEALTH CASES IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (OIG-16-113-VR) (2016), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P12191.pdf
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by prior exposure to increased noise and light levels. 46 Other studies show that factors known to disrupt normal sleep patterns, such as jet lag or shift work, are associated with increased severity of psychotic symptoms; 47 sleep disruption is common
in detention. These non-incarceration studies offer a scientific foundation for the
common observation by lawyers—including the authors—that clients can grow increasingly unable to work with counsel and access court proceedings due to incarceration’s exacerbation of their mental illness. 48 Multiple individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders have reported to one of the authors that their lived experiences while incarcerated are consistent with these studies. Clients reported increased psychotic symptoms, such as hallucinations or extreme paranoia, when they
were unable to sleep for days on end due to a jail’s chronic noise or policies mandating that lights remain on twenty-three to twenty-four-hours a day. Clients who
are survivors of sexual violence were retraumatized by the invasive nature of mandatory pat searches. As some clients became increasingly symptomatic, they reported both increasingly intense and new delusions. These harmful impacts of carceral environments increase with time; at least four studies of immigration detention
in the United States and Australia have found that a lengthening duration of incarceration is associated with increased severity of mental health symptoms. 49
In addition to the stressors of the detention environment, inadequate medical and
mental health care behind bars can cause severe harm to detained peoples’ mental
health. The inadequacy of care in pretrial incarceration is widely reported, 50 and extended periods of untreated psychotic symptoms are associated with increased risk

https://perma.cc/73RY-44PX]; JOHN V. KELLY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. CONCERNS ABOUT ICE
DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES (OIG-19-47) (2019),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf
[ttps://perma.cc/AVA8-G7AT]; Jackie Gonzalez, Bianca Sierra Wolff & Richard Diaz, Immigrant Detention in California: Opportunities for Accountability, DISABILITY RTS. CAL. (Aug. 10, 2021),
https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/Detention_Conditions_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ME9N-RTCH]; REBECCA GAMBLER, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20596, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ICE SHOULD ENHANCE ITS USE OF FACILITY OVERSIGHT DATA AND
MANAGEMENT OF DETAINEE COMPLAINTS (2020).
46 Rui Wang, Weichen Wang, Min S. H. Aung, Dror Ben-Zeev, Rachel Brian, Andrew T. Campbell, Tanzeem Choudhury, Marta Hauser, John Kane, Emily A. Scherer & Megan Walsh, Predicting
Symptom Trajectories of Schizophrenia using Mobile Sensing, 1 PROCEEDINGS ACM ON INTERACTIVE,
MOBILE, WEARABLE & UBIQUITOUS TECHS. 1–24 (2013).
47 Gregory Katz, Jet Lag and Psychotic Disorders, 13 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPS. 187–192
(2011).
48 See, e.g., Complaint, Doe v. Barr, No. 3:20-cv-2263 (N.D. Cal. 2020), 2020 WL 2733928, at
*1; Complaint, Domingo v. Barr, No. 3:20-cv-06089 (N.D. Cal. 2020), 2020 WL 5798238, at *1.
49 Janette P. Green & Kathy Eagar, The Health of People in Australian Immigration Detention
Centres, 192 MED. J. OF AUSTL. 65–70 (2010); Allen S. Keller, Barry Rosenfeld, Chau Trinh-Shevrin,
Chris Meserve, Emily Sachs, Jonathan A. Leviss, Elizabeth Singer, Hawthorne Smith, John Wilkinson,
Glen Kim, Kathleen Allden & Douglas Ford, Mental Health of Detained Asylum Seekers, 362 LANCET
1721–1723 (2003); Zachary Steel, Derrick Silove, Robert Brooks, Shakeh Momartin, Bushra Alzuhairi
& Ina Susljik, Impact of Immigration Detention and Temporary Protection on the Mental Health of
Refugees, 188 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 58–64 (2018); Peter Young & Michael S. Gordon, Mental Health
Screening in Immigration Detention: A Fresh Look at Australian Government Data, 24 AUSTRALASIAN
PSYCHIATRY 19–22 (2016).
50 See, e.g., Andrea Craig Armstrong, Prison Medical Deaths and Qualified Immunity, 112 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 79–104 (2022); KELLY, supra note 45; CODE RED The Fatal Consequences
of Dangerously Substandard Medical Care in Immigration Detention, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jun.
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for treatment-resistant symptoms, more frequent and longer subsequent psychotic
episodes, and poorer long-term functional outcomes. 51 Warning signs for psychiatric
illnesses are often missed. 52 Each of the authors knows of many individuals with
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder who have become actively psychotic while incarcerated.
In some circumstances, more robust mental health care may prevent decompensation in custody. But all too often, such care is either not on offer or insufficient.
On the outside, additional modalities of care, medications, and family or community
supports can change that result.
One of the authors has personally seen incarcerated clients’ mental decompensation limit their access to court proceedings. Several clients initially able to answer
basic questions about their past later had trouble recounting those same memories.
And several clients previously able to answer questions over the phone in their first
weeks of incarceration later avoided communicating with counsel or others about
their lives. As described in the Introduction, Mr. Doe, who had post-traumatic stress
disorder, ultimately found that he needed to communicate about the details of his
past only in writing. For several others with schizophrenia-spectrum disorder,
months of incarceration left them able to communicate only about their delusions,
not their actual experiences. A successful outcome in these clients’ cases depended
on a written declaration or oral testimony of their stories. But despite multiple attempts, no such evidence could be prepared, because incarceration had so severely
exacerbated their disabilities. In one case, the immigration judge cited the absence
of testimony in denying relief that might otherwise have been available. 53 The same
author has questioned whether her clients were able to make legal decisions conveying their true preferences, given how gravely pretrial incarceration had undermined
their ability to think and communicate.
Finally, incarcerated people with mental illness are disproportionately assigned
to extended solitary confinement, which is widely documented to cause physical and
mental decompensation, and even lead to suicide.54 Death by suicide is the starkest

20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/06/20/code-red/fatal-consequences-dangerously-substandard-medical-care-immigration [https://perma.cc/T8SA-TA65].
51 Robin Emsley, Bonginkosi Chiliza & Laila Asmal, The Evidence for Illness Progression after
Relapse in Schizophrenia, 148 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH 117–121 (2013).
52 See, e.g., Molly Grassini, Sophie Terp, Briah Fischer, Sameer Ahmed, Madeline Ross, Niels
Frenzen,Elizabeth Burner & Parveen Parmar, Analysis of Deaths Among Individuals in Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detention, 2011-2018, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Jul. 2021, at 1–11
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2781682
[https://perma.cc/QX9P39H2].
53 Court transcript on file with authors.
54 Complaint, Youngers v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., No. 20-cv-00465 (D. N.M. 2020); Complaint
for Violations of Civil, Constitutional, and Disability Rights of Chuong Woong Ahn A# 042-028-791,
at Mesa Verde ICE Processing Facility, DISABILITY RTS. CAL. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/2021-02-25_Ahn_Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/23YF-7DZL]; Jose Olivares, ICE Review of Immigrant’s Suicide Finds Falsified
Documents, Neglect, And Improper Confinement, INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2021), https://theintercept.com/2021/10/23/ice-review-neglect-stewart-suicide-corecivic/ [https://perma.cc/A3PN-SK8J];
Aaron J. Fischer, Rebecca Cervenak & Kim Swain, Suicides In San Diego County Jail, DISABILITY
RTS. CAL. (Apr., 2018), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/SDsuicideReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/79PZ-ZAEY]; MORGAN, supra note 29; Kayley Bebber, Cruel But Not Unusual: Solitary Confinement in Washington’s County Jails, DISABILITY RTS. WASH. (Nov. 2016),
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example of how a lack of disability accommodations can curtail the legal rights of
individuals with disabilities in court.

E. Visual and Auditory Disabilities
Finally, incarcerated people who have visual and/or auditory disabilities face the
already-described disadvantages, as well as others, in their court proceedings. Incarceration takes people away from the spaces in which they have implemented individualized methods to enable their own independence. So as with detained people
with mobility impairments, incarceration can create obstacles for people with visual
impairments to gain access to physical spaces important to protecting their legal
rights, such as interview and hearing rooms and law libraries. Incarceration also limits the ability of blind and low-vision people to communicate with their attorneys. 55
Written communication may be particularly challenging for people who are blind or
low-vision, but the accommodations typically made available—assignment of another detainee to “scribe”—undermine privacy and therefore court-access equality.
For detained people who are deaf or hard of hearing, the absence of auxiliary aids
and services such as hearing aids, amplifiers, video phones, and sign language interpreters can render attorney communication and court proceedings mostly or entirely
inaccessible. Moreover, jail authorities typically disallow detained people with these
kinds of needs to solve their own problems; they cannot bring in their own interpreters or use their own equipment. Thus they are far worse off in their court proceedings
than if they were not incarcerated.
Interviews with disability rights lawyers concretizes each of these general
points. For example, attorneys Eve Hill and Michael Nunez have represented blind
people in jail. Hill and Nunez have both found that carceral environments generally
lack the electronic communications and screen reader technologies many of their
blind and low-vision clients rely on, eliminating or limiting client access to the print
documents so crucial to legal cases—retainer agreements, complaints, answers,
etc. 56 Both have also found that even in facilities where screen reader technologies
are provided, they are not made available in confidential settings, so blind people
who use those technologies are unable to communicate privately with their counsel.
Where assistive technology or other electronic communications are out of reach, an
attorney may try to substitute Braille or large print documents. But, Nunez explains,
these steps help only for some: people who know Braille or who have sufficient
vision for large print. This covers only a small portion of the blind or low vision

https://www.disabilityrightswa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CruelButNotUnusual_November2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GRM-9Y6W]; Vega v. Davis, 572 F. App'x 611 (10th Cir. 2014); Cunningham v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 709 F. App'x 886 (10th Cir. 2017); Parveen Parmar, Madeline
Ross, Sophie Terp, Naomi Kearl, Briah Fischer, Molly Grassini, Sameer Ahmed, Niels Frenzen &
Elizabeth Burner, Mapping Factors Associated with Deaths in Immigration Detention in the United
States, 2011–2018: A Thematic Analysis, 2 LANCET REG’L HEALTH – AMS. 100040 (2021); Sophie Terp,
Sameer Ahmed, Elizabeth Burner, Madeline Ross, Molly Grassini, Briah Fischer & Parveen Parmar,
Deaths in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detention: FY 2018-2020, 8 AIMS PUBLIC
HEALTH 81 (2021).
55 Zoom Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Eve Hill, Partner, Brown Goldstein & Levy (Jan.
11, 2022).
56 Id; Zoom Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Michael Nunez, Senior Counsel, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP (Jan. 27, 2022) [hereinafter Nunez Interview].
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population; knowledge of Braille is rare, 57 and even people who can read large print
for a limited time may get headaches or otherwise be unable to read long legal documents. 58 Hill has used audio CDs to communicate with blind clients when facilities
have CD players and permit clients to use them. 59 For most incarcerated people who
are blind or low-vision, the usual accommodation their jails offer is to have a sighted
officer or other detained person read documents aloud. This obviously eliminates
the disabled individual’s privacy and often provides only poor-quality access, depending on the care and qualifications of readers not trained to read legal documents.
60
Blind people’s inability to communicate fully with their attorneys and to access
legal documents makes them less likely to reach a positive outcome in their case,
compared with their prospects with the avenues of communication available outside
of custody. Both Nunez and Hill describe hearing from blind and low-vision people
who were unrepresented that they missed deadlines for asserting their rights and
defending themselves in court because of communication challenges caused by incarceration. 61
People who are deaf or hard of hearing and incarcerated are likewise disadvantaged in court proceedings because of their disability. Carceral environments routinely deprive people of adequate hearing aids, ensuring incarcerated people lack the
aids for court proceedings. 62 In a typical example, after a client of one of the authors
repeatedly told an immigration judge that he needed a hearing aid for court and that
medical professionals in detention had denied him such an aid, the judge simply
stated that the client’s medical care in detention was not the judge’s responsibility. 63
This client was also drastically limited in communications with his attorney because
telephone calls were nearly impossible for him without a hearing aid. Other clients
need but lack access to captioned telephones.64 While some hard-of-hearing people
may be better able to communicate with their lawyers if meetings are in person,
telephonic communication is vitally important, particularly given the often remote
locations of incarcerating facilities. And when individuals who are deaf or hard of
hearing are held in solitary confinement, it is still more difficult for them to communicate with attorneys because they are so often denied legal visits and access to
telephones. 65

There are no reliable statistics on Braille literacy for blind people, though many sources estimate
a rate of 10%. See Rebecca M. Sheffield, France M. D’Andrea, Valerie Morash & Sarah Chatfield,
How Many Braille Readers? Policy, Politics, and Perception, 116 J. VISUAL IMPAIRMENT & BLINDNESS
14 (2022).
58 Nunez Interview, supra note 56.
59 Zoom Interview with Eve Hill, supra note 55.
60 Id.
61 Id; Nunez Interview, supra note 56.
62 TALILA A. LEWIS, #DEAFINPRISON CAMPAIGN FACT SHEET (2018), https://behearddc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/DeafInPrison-Fact-Sheet-.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS2H-6LT2]; Rebecca Vallas, The Mass Incarceration of People With Disabilities in America’s Jails and Prisons, DISABLED
BEHIND BARS (Jul. 18, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/07/18/141447/disabled-behind-bars/ [https://perma.cc/XN4Q-23MJ].
63 Immigration court transcript on file with the authors.
64 Zoom Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Claudia Center, Legal Dir., Disability Rts. Educ.
& Def. Fund (Jan. 10, 2022).
65 Telephone Interview with Pilar Gonzalez Morales, supra note 43; Order, supra note 25 (California department of corrections found to place people with disabilities in administrative segregation
due to a lack of accessible housing); LEWIS, supra note 62; Talila A. Lewis, HEARD Publishes Second
57
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For detained people who use sign language to communicate, the situation is even
worse. Claudia Center, the Legal Director of the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, reports that many jails and detention facilities frequently lack video
communication technology or sign language interpreters; 66 carceral facilities across
the country continue to refuse to offer videophones or video interpretation until they
are sued. 67 Without videophones, individuals who use sign language cannot talk to
their lawyers except in person. Even facilities that have videophones sometimes
drastically limit access. Disability rights attorney Rosa Lee Bichell tells of a deaf
client who had access to the technology only on rare occasions during his year in
custody, and only outside of business hours. 68 Lacking videophones or remote or inperson interpretation, facilities instead assign officers and other detained people to
serve as communication aides for people with hearing impairments, regardless of
whether the aides have any qualifications, training, or knowledge of sign language. 69
It’s this kind of arrangement that led to one incarcerated deaf immigrant to inadvertently ratify her own deportation when an ICE officer presented a form for her signature without communicating that the contents of the form stated that she was voluntarily consenting to her deportation. 70 All of these kinds of situations mean, as
with individuals with physical disabilities in pretrial incarceration, blind/low-vision

Report on Abuse of Deaf Prisoners in Florida, HELPING EDUC. TO ADVANCE THE RTS. OF THE DEAF
(May 23, 2014), https://behearddc.org/heard-publishes-second-report-on-abuse-of-deaf-prisoners-inflorida/ [https://perma.cc/W259-4UK2]; James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Deaf Prisoners in Florida
Face Abuse and Solitary Confinement, SOLITARY WATCH (May 21, 2013), http://solitarywatch.com/2013/05/21/deaf-prisoners-in-florida-face-brutality-and-solitary-confinement
[https://perma.cc/5NSD-MM7V].
66 Zoom Interview with Claudia Center, supra note 64; Order, supra note 25 (California department of corrections found to deny sign language interpreters to people who need them); Complaint,
Zemedagegehu v. Arthur, No. 1:15-cv-00057-JCCS-MSN (E.D. Va. 2015), 2015 WL 1930539 (Deaf
Ethiopian-born American citizen sues Virginia Department of Corrections for denying him an ASL
interpreter); Yeh v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:18-CV-943, 2000 WL 1505661 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
2020) (request for videophone denied); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REACHES AGREEMENT WITH THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION TO INMATES WITH HEARING DISABILITIES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-reaches-agreement-south-carolina-department-corrections-provide-effective
[https://perma.cc/YM92-4F3M] (unfiled lawsuit in which plaintiffs alleged a failure to provide them
with sign language interpreters and other auxiliary aids and services).
67 For examples of such lawsuits, see Rogers v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:16-cv-02733-STVNRN, 2019 WL 1558081 (D. Colo. 2019) (summary available at Case: Rogers v. Colorado Department
LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://clearinghouse.net/case/16222
of
Corrections,
C.R.
[https://perma.cc/78L8-CEEE]); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2017); Settlement Agreement, Smith v. Reinke, No. 12-cv-0030-BLW (D. Idaho 2014), 2014 WL 2203896 (summary of case available at Case: Smith v. Reinke, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://clearinghouse.net/case/17035 [https://perma.cc/5GFM-MHZQ]); Settlement Agreement, Disability Rts. Fla. v.
Jones, No. 4:16-cv-47-RH-CAS (N.D. Florida 2017) (summary of case available at Case: Disability
Rights Florida v. Jones, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://clearinghouse.net/case/16480
[https://perma.cc/FWG3-8RFK]); Complaint, Coen v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., No. 5:16-cv-00353MTT (M.D. Ga. 2019) (summary of case available at Case: Coen v. Georgia Department of Corrections, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://clearinghouse.net/case/17001 [https://perma.cc/9ZQ6Q23J]).
68 Zoom Interview by Roxana Moussavian with Rosa Lee Bichell, Staff Att’y, Disability Rts.
Advocs. (Jan. 7, 2022).
69 See Lewis, supra note 65.
70 Zoom Interview with Rosa Lee Bichell, supra note 68.
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and deaf/low-hearing individuals are often deprived of meaningful access to their
criminal and immigration proceedings because of their disabilities.
In short, for all types of disabilities, the conditions of pretrial incarceration can
and often do create obstacles to meaningful and equal participation in the very purpose of that detention—court proceedings. The disability rights statutes require reasonable modifications to avoid such discrimination.
II. THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE ADA SOMETIMES REQUIRE
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION AS A REASONABLE MODIFICATION OF
GOVERNMENT PRACTICE: APPLICABLE STANDARDS
As the Introduction and Part I begin to lay out, this article argues that pretrial
incarceration of individuals with disabilities sometimes deprives them—because of
their disabilities—of meaningful access to the criminal or immigration hearing that
underlies their incarceration. Here, we set out the statutory framework under which
a person with a disability who makes a showing to that effect can ask for an alternative to detention as a reasonable modification to ordinary government operations
that have (or threaten to) put them behind bars. Denial of such a modification, in
these circumstances, amounts to unlawful disability discrimination, unless release
would actually threaten public safety. To be clear, it is not our claim that no person
with a disability can lawfully be subjected to pretrial incarceration. The argument is
more limited: where the conditions of pretrial incarceration specially undermine
people with disabilities’ access to legal proceedings and changes to those conditions
will not adequately improve access, disability antidiscrimination law insists alternatives to detention as a reasonable modification, absent individualized public safety
risk that cannot otherwise be addressed.
An aside: There has been a good deal of deinstitutionalization litigation under
the quite different ADA theory endorsed by Olmstead v. L.C. 71 There, the Supreme
Court interpreted the ADA’s antidiscrimination promise to limit the extent to which
states may insist on providing disability-related services in isolated institutions rather than in community settings. The court explained,
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life. . . .
Second, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday
life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts,
work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment. 72
Accordingly, the ADA disallows state insistence that “[i]n order to receive needed
medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities,
relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given reasonable accom-

71
72

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 600, 601.
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modations, while persons without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice.” 73 Olmstead-type arguments seem entirely
applicable to some incarceration of some people with disabilities—for example,
when the state puts individuals seeking mental health services in jail (without criminal charge or sentence). 74 Our argument applies to a different kind of incarceration,
nominally auxiliary to a criminal or immigration proceeding.

A. Sources of Law and What they Cover
With overlapping coverage, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
Title II of the ADA both prohibit disability discrimination in the operation of government programs. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 75 provides, in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . .
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service. 76
ADA Title II 77 similarly states:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 78
Between the two statutes, every American governmental entity is covered. Federal agency activity, while not included under ADA Title II, is covered by the Rehabilitation Act. 79 The Rehabilitation Act also covers most state and local criminal
programs, because they receive federal financial assistance.80 ADA Title II also covers all non-federal government operations—its definition of “public entity” includes state and local government agencies without respect to federal support. 81
While their coverage is different, the substantive requirements of these two statutes

Id. at 600, 601.
See, e.g., First Report of the Court Monitor, United States v. Mississippi, 3:16-cv-00622, at 14,
15, 17, 21, 36 (Mar. 4, 2022, S.D. Miss.), https://clearinghouse.net/doc/130690/
[https://perma.cc/UM44-XJUP](identifying problem of individuals waiting in jail for admission to psychiatric hospitals).
75 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq.
76 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165.
78 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
79 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
80 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A) (defining “program or activity” as “a department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government”).
81 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
73
74
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are generally the same. 82 We address each separately for clarity, but as will be seen,
the analysis is nearly identical.
The government programs and activities relevant here are those criminal or immigration proceedings to which pretrial incarceration is ancillary. As Part I developed, it is frequently the case that when people with disabilities are subjected to
pretrial incarceration, they lose meaningful access to their criminal or immigration
proceedings because of their disability.
There is no question that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act protect individuals
with disabilities from discrimination in a variety of contexts—including in programs
within both immigration and criminal systems. The statutory texts are extremely
broad: the Rehabilitation Act, as already quoted, covers federally conducted or assisted “program[s] or activit[ies],” and the ADA covers “services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” As the Justice Department explained in promulgating the
lead Rehabilitation Act regulation (the model for other agencies’ regulations), “a
federally conducted program or activity is, in simple terms, anything a Federal
agency does.” 83
Non-regulation governmental sources agree. For example, in a June 2016 publication titled Component Self-Evaluation and Planning Reference Guide, whose
purpose was to “assist DHS Components in their efforts to strengthen compliance
with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,” DHS wrote:
There are two major categories of federally conducted programs or activities covered by Section 504: those involving general public contact as part
of ongoing agency operations and those directly administered by the
agency for program beneficiaries and participants. . . . Activities in the
second category include programs that provide federal services or benefits.
Examples include immigration and naturalization benefits, federal disaster
services, airport security screening, federal building security screening,
protective security at major events, customs activities, border protection

See, e.g., Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1260 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999)) (“Further, the courts have tended to construe section 504 in pari materia with Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, reasoning that these
statutory provisions are ‘similar in substance’ . . . and consequently ‘cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable.’”); Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 908
(6th Cir. 2004); Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 845 n.6 (7th Cir.
1999); Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 146 n 6 (2d Cir. 2002); Rodriguez v. City
of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (“Because Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA impose
identical requirements, we consider these claims in tandem.”); Cercpac v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 147
F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1998); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).
83 Enforcement of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally Conducted Programs,
49 Fed. Reg. 35,725 (Sept. 11, 1984) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 39). The ADA requires the Department
of Justice (DOJ) to promulgate regulations implementing Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12134, and it is these
regulations that contain the specific prohibitions and requirements of Title II. With a few exceptions,
Title II provides that the regulations must be consistent with the Department of Justice Section 504
“coordination regulations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b).
82
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activities, and enforcement of immigration laws and operation of immigration detention facilities. 84
Likewise, consistent case law construes “the ADA’s broad language [as]
bring[ing] within its scope ‘anything a public entity does.’” 85 Defendants sometimes
claim an exemption from the disability antidiscrimination laws because of the nature
of their activities. These claims generally fail. More specifically, both executive and
judicial sources demonstrate that there is no exemption from the general antidiscrimination rules for programs related to criminal law/detention, immigration, or court
processing.
The ADA made the Department of Justice the statute’s lead implementing
agency, responsible for issuing regulations, 86 “coordinat[ing] the compliance activities of Federal agencies with respect to State and local government components,”
and implementing compliance work involving “[a]ll programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to law enforcement, public safety, and the administration of
justice, including courts and correctional institutions.” 87 Not only are the DOJ regulations entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.; 88 DOJ’s interpretation of its own regulations also merits particular
weight. 89 And DOJ has explained that Title II requires that “state and local government criminal justice entities . . . must ensure that people with mental health disabilities or I/DD [intellectual and developmental disabilities] are treated equally in
the criminal justice system.” 90 A DOJ guidance document states that Title II covers
“the services, programs, and activities of . . . law enforcement, corrections, and justice system entities,” including, among others: “assessing individuals for diversion
programs, conducting arraignment, setting bail or conditions of release, taking testimony, sentencing, providing notices of rights, determining whether to revoke probation or parole, or making service referrals, whether by prosecutors and public defense attorneys, courts, juvenile justice systems, pre-trial services, or probation and

84 MEGAN H. MACK, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDE 065-01-001-01, COMPONENT SELFEVALUATION & PLANNING REFERENCE GUIDE (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/disability-guide-component-self-evaluation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JS9-MQY4]
(emphasis
added).
85 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Yeskey v. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997), aff'd, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)); see also Johnson v. City
of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998) (“the phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ encompasses virtually everything that a public entity does”); Innovative Health Sys. v. City of White Plains,
117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the phrase “programs, services, or activities” is “a catchall phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context”), superseded
on other grounds, Zervos v. Verizon New York, 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001).
86 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a).
87 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (2021).
88 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
89 In the classic formulation, such interpretations are “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Note that the Supreme
Court cautioned in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (2019), that Auer deference covers only
“reasonable agency reading[s] of a genuinely ambiguous rule,” and only where “the character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”
90 U.S. Dep’t of Just., C.R. Div., Examples and Resources to Support Criminal Justice Entities in
Compliance with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (2017), https://www.ada.gov/cjta.html.
[https://perma.cc/5VMK-KGMV]
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parole services”; “parole and release programs,” and “detentions.” 91 It offers as an
example of ADA implementation that some jurisdictions have “[r]equired court staff
to explore reasonable modifications to allow qualified individuals with these disabilities to participate in diversion and probation programs and specialty courts.” 92
Still more definitive, the Supreme Court rejected criminal system exceptionalism in a 1998 ADA Title II case, Penn. Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey. 93 In a unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court comprehensively denied a
prison system’s effort to restrict antidiscrimination coverage to voluntary programs,
or those that provide desired “benefits,” holding that Title II of the ADA unambiguously covers state prisoners’ access to prison programs, such as recreational activities, medical services, and educational and vocational offerings. Circuit courts have
repeatedly confirmed Yeskey’s holding. 94
As the DOJ guidance quoted above suggests, court proceedings are covered by
the statutes as well. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court, among other holdings,
upheld Title II’s application to safeguard access to justice for a paraplegic criminal
defendant required to appear in an inaccessible courtroom. 95 The Court noted that
Congress enacted the statute in part to prophylactically serve several access-tocourts constitutional rights, among them the “right to be present at all stages of the
trial where [a defendant’s] absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings”
and “meaningful opportunity to be heard” in judicial proceedings. 96 Courts of Appeals have repeatedly recognized this right. 97
Nor is there any immigration exclusion from the Rehabilitation Act or ADA
Title II. Courts have found Rehabilitation Act coverage, for example, in cases about
appointment of immigration counsel as a reasonable accommodation, 98 about immigration detention conditions, 99 and—most similar to the argument made here—
about immigration proceedings for people detained during the COVID-19 pandemic. 100
91
92

ters).

Id.
Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.152 (setting out specific rules for jails, prisons, and detention cen-

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210–11 (1998).
See, e.g., Wright v. New York State Dep't of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Both the
ADA and the RA undoubtedly apply to state prisons and their prisoners.”); Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d
996, 997 (6th Cir. 1999) (“…it is now established that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply to
prisoners…”). For discussion, see SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 308–29 (3d ed. 2021).
95 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., McCauley v. Georgia 466 F. App'x 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2012) (recognizing plaintiff’s
right to seek access to the courts); Bedford v. Michigan, 722 F. App'x 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2018) (recognizing application of Lane to class of cases implicating access to justice); Crawford v. Hinds Cnty. Bd.
of Supervisors, 1 F.4th 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding person with disability who had twice been
unable to complete jury service had standing to sue).
98 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 2:10-cv-02211-DMG, 2013 WL 8115423, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2013).
99 Moran v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 20-cv-0696-DOC-JDE, 2020 WL 6083445, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020).
100 See Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F.Supp.3d 709, 747–48 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
(finding that Section 504 covered immigration proceedings and noting no counterargument from ICE),
rev’d on alternate grounds, 16 F.4th 613, 650 (9th Cir. 2021) (reversing based on assessment of evidence, not disagreement with the liability theory).
93
94
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In short, like other people with disabilities, people with disabilities in both criminal and immigration pretrial incarceration can bring lawsuits under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act if they can show that they are: (1) disabled within the meaning of
the statutes; 101 (2) “qualified” to participate in the relevant program; and (3) “excluded from,” “denied the benefits of,” or otherwise “subjected to discrimination” 102
relating to a governmental program, (4) “by reason of . . . disability” (“solely by
reason” under the Rehabilitation Act). As explained in the accompanying footnote,
the first of these requirements is not controversial. The following sections address
requirements (2)-(4) in turn: Section II.B addresses items (2) and (3), which are intertwined, both with each other and also with the antidiscrimination requirement that
governments agree to “reasonable modifications” (but not to “fundamental alterations”) to policies and practices that would otherwise exclude people with disabilities. Section II.C examines (4).

B. Qualified Individual/Reasonable Modification/Fundamental Alteration
1. The Standard: Meaningful Access
The foundational case explaining what kinds of exclusions from programs/services/activities constitute unlawful discrimination is Alexander v. Choate, 103 a unanimous 1985 Supreme Court opinion by Justice Marshall. In Choate the Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the state violated the Rehabilitation Act by reducing
how many days of inpatient care Medicaid would cover. The Court first emphasized
that discriminatory animus against people with disabilities was not a prerequisite to
Rehabilitation Act liability: “much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in
passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the
Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.” 104 At the
same time, the Court held, the statute required a showing of more than disproportionate effects caused by facially neutral policies. Choate announced the “meaningful access” standard: that “otherwise qualified” people with disabilities must be
granted reasonable modifications so that they are “provided with meaningful access”
to the program in question. 105 Moreover, the Court explained that “the question of
who is ‘otherwise qualified’ and what actions constitute ‘discrimination’ under the
section would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is the

Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a person has a disability if: (i) a physical or
mental impairment substantially limits one or more of his or her major life activities; (ii) he or she has
a record of such an impairment; or (iii) he or she is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 U.S.C.
§ 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)–(2). Particularly relevant here, “mental” impairments are expressly included if they substantially limit major life activities. The ADA regulations on the definition
of disability, 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i), are quite capacious. Moreover, in the ADA Amendments Act
of 2008, Congress clarified and broadened the definition. Under the Amendments Act, an impairment
constitutes a disability even if it: (1) only substantially limits one major life activity; or (2) is episodic
or in remission, if it would substantially limit at least one major life activity if active. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 Sec. 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3556.
102 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
103 469 U.S. 287 (1984).
104 Id. at 296–97.
105 Id. at 300–01.
101
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extent to which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications in its programs.” 106
So what is meaningful access? Choate pointed with approval to a Rehabilitation
Act regulation that “meaningful access” does not mean merely some or minimal
access but rather protects equal opportunity: While “aids, benefits, and services . . .
are not required to produce the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped[ 107] and nonhandicapped persons, [they] must afford handicapped persons
equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the
same level of achievement.” 108
Other federal departments’ Rehabilitation Act regulations include similar language. After quoting or paraphrasing the Rehabilitation Act’s statutory text, they
endorse an “equal opportunity” standard with only slight variations in phrasing. For
example:
◊

◊

◊

“A recipient may not discriminate on the basis of handicap in the following
ways directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements under any program receiving Federal financial assistance . . . (ii) Deny a
qualified handicapped person an equal opportunity to achieve the same
benefits that others achieve in the program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 109 (DOJ Rehabilitation Act regulation on federally
assisted programs)
“The agency, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or
through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of handicap— . . . (ii) Afford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal
to that afforded others.” 110 (DOJ Rehabilitation Act regulation on federally
conducted programs)
“The Department, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis
of disability . . . (ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that
is not equal to that afforded others.” 111 (Department of Homeland Security
Rehabilitation Act regulation on federally conducted programs)

Choate, 469 U.S. at 299 n.19.
Many disability statutes and regulations, including those cited here, use the outdated term
“handicap,” which is synonymous with “disability.” This article uses the term “disability” throughout
but leaves in “handicap” when directly quoting law or regulation.
108 Choate, 469 U.S. at 305 (quoting the Department of Health Education and Welfare’s Rehabilitation Act federally-assisted regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2)). In Traynor v. Turnage, the Court
noted the deference owed the HEW regulation, stating: “We have previously recognized that the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (later the Department of
Health and Human Services) to implement the Rehabilitation Act ‘were drafted with the oversight and
approval of Congress,’ and therefore constitute ‘an important source of guidance on the meaning of §
504.’” 485 U.S. 535, 550 n.10 (1988) (citations omitted).
109 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b)(1).
110 28 C.F.R. § 39.130(b)(1).
111 6 C.F.R. § 15.30(b)(1). There is no DHS federally assisted regulation.
106
107
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Leaning variously on Choate or the regulations, subsequent court of appeals
case law reaches the “meaningful access” standard, 112 holding that the “meaningful
access standard . . . ensure[s] an equal opportunity.” 113
Choate’s “meaningful access” approach governs the Rehabilitation Act, of
course. Congress then expressly adopted the same rules when it enacted the ADA,
defining “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision
of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity.” 114 In turn, the Title II ADA regulations incorporate the rest of Choate’s language, stating: “A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making
the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity.” 115
As under the Rehabilitation Act, “meaningful access” under the ADA has been
interpreted to mean substantially equal access. Like the Rehabilitation Act regulations just quoted, the ADA Title II regulation states:
A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly
or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of
disability— . . . (ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that
is not equal to that afforded others. 116
And case law again endorses that meaningful access means equal access. 117
See, e.g., Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013) (denying summary
judgment on the “meaningful access” issue because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the defendant “denied [the plaintiff] an equal opportunity to gain the same benefit from medical school as his nondisabled peers by refusing to provide his requested accommodations.”); Randolph
v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir.1999) (applying a “meaningful access” standard to a Rehabilitation Act claim brought by a hearing-impaired prisoner denied an interpreter during internal disciplinary proceedings, and affirming summary judgment for the prisoner because “although he ha[d] been
provided some form of those benefits, he ha[d] not received the full benefits solely because of his
disability.”); Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 343 (11th Cir. 2012) (the “proper
inquiry” under the Rehabilitation Act to determine if a hospital had provided “necessary” auxiliary aids
to a hearing-impaired patient was whether the proffered aids “gave that patient an equal opportunity to
benefit from the hospital's treatment.”).
113 Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 449.
114 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Reasonable modification is thus ADA Title II’s (and Title III’s) equivalent of the more familiar “reasonable accommodation” requirement in Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)–(9).
115 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). The separate requirement of program accessibility has a similar
defense that no “fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or . . . undue
financial and administrative burdens” are required. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). Just as “reasonable modification” is the analog to Title I’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement, “fundamental alteration”
and “undue burden” are the analogs of Title I’s “undue hardship.”
116 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1).
117 See, e.g., K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding, based on analogous communications-related provision, that “Title II and its implementing
112
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Thus, under both the Rehabilitation Act and ADA Title II, liability attaches for
disability discrimination based not on discriminatory intent but on failure, intentional or not, to provide individuals with disabilities an opportunity equal to that
afforded nondisabled people to participate in or benefit from government programs,
where—as the next section explains, equality could be accomplished by a reasonable
modification to the rules or practices governing the service, program, or activity.

2. The Standard: Reasonable Modification/Fundamental Alteration
If governmental rules or practices would otherwise deprive people with disabilities of meaningful (that is, equal) access to programs, services, or activities, the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA require “reasonable modification.” Again, it was Choate that set the point at which “a refusal to modify an existing program might become
unreasonable and discriminatory,” and found that such refusals violated the statute
unless the requested modification would amount to a “fundamental alteration in the
nature of a program,” rather than a “reasonable modification[] the statute or regulations required.” 118 We address in Section III.A the specific argument that release
from detention falls on the “fundamental alteration” side of the line; here, we present
the case law more generally.
We note that, in litigation procedure, the reasonable modification showing is
part of the plaintiffs’ case in chief, whereas it is the defendants’ burden to assert and
prove the “fundamental alteration” defense. The plaintiffs can make their showing
of reasonableness by pointing to the general practicability of the requested modification—its (low enough) cost, workability, and the like. It is for defendants to plead
and prove that notwithstanding practicalities, the requested modification is out of
bounds in the specific case. 119
regulations, taken together, require public entities to take steps towards making existing services not
just accessible, but equally accessible to people with communication disabilities . . . insofar as doing
so does not pose an undue burden or require a fundamental alteration of their programs”) (emphasis in
original); Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (same, under
ADA Title III); Profita v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 709 F. App'x 917, 920 (10th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that a reasonable accommodation must provide meaningful access “by permitting a qualified individual with a disability to ‘obtain the same benefits made available to nondisabled individuals’” (quoting Taylor v. Colo. Dep't of Health Care Policy & Fin., 811 F.3d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir.
2016)); Doran v. 7-Eleven, 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ADA . . . outlaws discrimination based on disability ‘in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, [and] facilities’ made
available at places of public accommodation . . . and does not limit its antidiscrimination mandate to
barriers that completely prohibit access.”); Keller v. Chippewa Cnty., Michigan Bd. of Commissioners,
860 F. App'x 381, 387 (6th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Keller v. Chippewa Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 142 S. Ct. 761 (2022) (“[T]he simple fact that [the plaintiff] successfully used [the toilet
and sink] does not necessarily mean that he had meaningful access. Other courts have recognized that
a plaintiff who succeeds in using a prison restroom only through an excessive or painful effort may
have a valid ADA claim.”).
118 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300–01 (1984).
119 See Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997):The plaintiff meets
this burden by introducing evidence that the requested modification is reasonable in the general sense, that is, reasonable in the run of cases. While the defendant may introduce evidence
indicating that the plaintiff's requested modification is not reasonable in the run of cases, the
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof on the issue. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the
defendant must make the requested modification unless the defendant pleads and meets its
burden of proving that the requested modification would fundamentally alter the nature of
the public accommodation. The type of evidence that satisfies this burden focuses on the
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As the Supreme Court explained in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, a case interpreting
ADA Title III (whose statutory text codifies the Choate reasonable modification/fundamental alteration divide), a modification is considered fundamental only
if it alters a program’s “essential aspect[s].” 120 In addition, parallel regulations that
implemented the pre-Choate precedent of Southeast Community College v. Davis, 121
also require each federal agency to ensure that each of its “program[s] or activit[ies]
. . . when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by” individuals
with a disability, but not “to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in
a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program or activity or in undue financial
and administrative burdens.” 122
Within these limits, a failure to implement a reasonable modification needed by
a person with a disability constitutes a type of discrimination. 123 Fact-intensive analysis determines whether the particular change to a policy or practice an individual
with a disability seeks is a reasonable modification, which the government is required to undertake, or rather fundamental alteration that is not. Some examples of
modifications courts have deemed required under the Rehabilitation Act and/or the
ADA include:
•

•

In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the Supreme Court held that a professional
golfer’s use of a golf cart during tournaments would not constitute a fundamental alteration and therefore had to be allowed. 124
In American Council of the Blind v. Paulsen, the D.C. Circuit required introduction of features to make currency accessible to blind people or those
with low-vision. The court held that omitting this reasonable modification
would deprive plaintiffs of “meaningful access” to a benefit available to the
general public—the ability to engage in economic activity—in violation of
the Rehabilitation Act. 125

specifics of the plaintiff's or defendant's circumstances and not on the general nature of the
accommodation. Under the statutory framework, such evidence is relevant only to a fundamental alteration defense and not relevant to the plaintiff's burden to show that the requested
modification is reasonable in the run of cases.
Johnson was a Title III case, but courts have followed its lead in Title II cases as well. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. Bd. of Commissioners of Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 484 F. Supp. 3d 346, 426–
27 (E.D. La. 2020), aff'd sub nom. Bailey v. France, 852 F. App'x 852 (5th Cir. 2021); Nat'l Fed'n of
the Blind, Inc. v. Lamone, 438 F. Supp. 3d 510, 528 (D. Md. 2020); Belancio v. Kansas Dep't of Health
& Env't, No. 17-cv-1180, 2018 WL 4538451, at *8 n.38 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2018).
120 532 U.S. 661, 682 (2001).
121 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
122 28 C.F.R. § 39.150(a) see also 6 C.F.R. § 15.50(a). In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, a
plurality opinion by Justice Ginsburg unpacked the “undue hardship” part of the test:
the “undue hardship” inquiry requires not simply an assessment of the cost of the accommodation
in relation to the recipient's overall budget, but a “case-by-case analysis weighing factors that
include: (1) the overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget; (2 )the type of the recipient's operation, including the
composition and structure of the recipient's workforce; and (3) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed.”
527 U.S. 581, 606 n.16 (1999) (plurality opinion of Ginsburg, J.).
123 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531–32 (2004).
124 532 U.S. at 690–91.
125 Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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In Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, the District Court for the Central District of
California held that the Rehabilitation Act required the federal government
to ensure legal representation for all detained noncitizens facing removal
proceedings whose psychiatric disabilities rendered them incompetent to
represent themselves in removal or custody hearings, because otherwise
plaintiffs would be unable to meaningfully participate in those hearings. 126
In Henrietta D. v. Giuliani and Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, a district court
held, and the Second Circuit affirmed, 127 that “intensive case management
and low case manager-to-client ratios” and other similar reasonable modifications were required to ensure people with HIV meaningful access to the
same benefits and services others received. Both the district court and the
court of appeals expressly rejected the claim that these management modifications constituted “additional benefits, or better benefits, than the nondisabled receive, which the law does not compel.” Rather, they were reasonable modifications “required to ensure meaningful access to the same
benefits and services” as non-disabled people received. 128
In Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., the Ninth Circuit held that (absent
a demonstration of a safety problem) Walt Disney could be required by the
ADA’s Title III to grant a waiver of its rule barring guest use of a Segway;
reasonable modifications include steps “to provide [non-disabled and] disabled guests with a like experience.” 129
In Armstrong v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit found that the State of California
had deprived a class of disabled prisoner plaintiffs of meaningful access to
parole processes, and affirmed in pertinent part an injunction mandating reasonable modifications to existing practice. The injunction included provisions, for example, that required the state to “redraft its policies to ensure
that prisoners and parolees are . . . ‘able to participate, to the best of their
abilities, in any parole proceeding’”; and “to create and maintain a system
for tracking disabled prisoners and parolees, and provide them with accommodations at parole and parole revocation proceedings.” 130
In Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff—
whose AIDS rendered him unable to work and therefore financially ineligible to be defendant’s tenant—was entitled to waiver of the rule against cosigners; relying in part on Rehabilitation Act case law, the court found the
waiver to constitute a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing
Amendments Act. 131
In Pashby v. Delia, the Fourth Circuit held that the fundamental alteration
defense did not bar requiring continuation of in-home services after a change

126 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 10-cv-02211-DMG, 2013 WL 3674492, at *4–6 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
23, 2013). For more information on the Franco-Gonzalez litigation, which included numerous pertinent
district court opinions, see Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://clearinghouse.net/case/12744/ [https://perma.cc/R5GW-L2KV].
127 Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Henrietta
D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003).
128 Henrietta D., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 212; see also Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 282–83.
129 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012).
130 275 F.3d 849, 859 (9th Cir. 2001).
131 343 F.3d 1143, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003).
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in state Medicaid requirements put class members at risk of institutionalization. 132
In each example, the court found both that the modification was needed to deliver equal access to the program in question, and that the modification’s change to
defendant practices was not profound enough to defeat the ADA/Rehabilitation Act
claim. As the list makes clear, there are many different forms of reasonable modifications. Moreover, modifications need not simply waive disqualifications to count
as reasonable—they frequently provide preferential treatment or other advantages
to people with disabilities. The Supreme Court explained in an ADA Title I (employment) case that an argument to the contrary
fails to recognize what the Act specifies, namely, that preferences will
sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity
goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of “reasonable accommodations” that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same
workplace opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy. By definition any special “accommodation” requires the employer to
treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the
fact that the difference in treatment violates an employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act's potential reach. 133
In addition, while courts have occasionally emphasized the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s reference to “benefits,” the Supreme Court has made clear that the statutes do not apply only to chosen or beneficial government programs. The Court rejected the “benefits” argument in Yeskey, emphasizing that the statutory “benefits”
language is coupled with a more general textual reference to “exclu[sion] from participation” and in any event should be understood broadly:
Petitioners contend that the phrase “benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity,” creates an ambiguity, because state prisons
do not provide prisoners with “benefits” of “programs, services, or activities” as those terms are ordinarily understood. We disagree. Modern prisons provide inmates with many recreational “activities,” medical “services,” and educational and vocational “programs,” all of which at least
theoretically “benefit” the prisoners (and any of which disabled prisoners
could be “excluded from participation in”). 134

3. What Is the Program?
Whether a modification is considered reasonable or, instead, fundamental because it alters a program or benefit’s “essential aspect[s],” turns analytically on how
the program or benefit in question is identified. Parties frequently contest the level

709 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013).
US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (emphasis in original).
134 Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (citations omitted).
132
133
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of generality at which this identification should occur. 135 That is not the issue here,
though. Rather, the question likely to arise is whether it is appropriate to identify the
program at issue as the criminal/immigration proceedings, or whether, a claim for
an alternative to detention must necessarily proceed by demonstrating discrimination (including deprivations of meaningful access) in existing bail or other non-detention gatekeeping practices themselves. There is no doubt that bail and other alternatives-to-detention programs do constitute programs to which the ADA and Rehabilitation Act guarantee meaningful access. Recall the DOJ guidance document
quoted above, which explicitly says just that—that Title II covers programs “assessing individuals for diversion programs, conducting arraignment, setting bail or
conditions of release.” 136 When people with disabilities are discriminated against in
the operations of bail and diversionary programs, that is surely a Title II or Rehabilitation Act violation. But it is wrong to think that either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act allows only that framing.
As an analogy, consider the (more frequently litigated) arenas of educational or
employment accommodation. Claimants in these areas often proceed on claims that
some test or job requirement is being administered in a discriminatory matter—for
example, that a test must be provided in a format accessible to participants who are
blind or deaf. But where the test cannot be made fair, they and/or other claimants
also bring claims that they are entitled to a waiver of the test or requirement in order
to allow their meaningful access to the opportunity at stake. 137 So here, government
agencies are required both to avoid discrimination in—including by providing meaningful access to—all their alternatives-to-detention programs and to avoid discrimination in their criminal/immigration proceedings, including by waiving existing alternatives-to-detention limits for people with disabilities if detention is obstructing
or would obstruct equal access to the underlying proceedings.
Again building from Choate, case law addresses this “what is the program” issue
by distinguishing between access to existing government programs—which is required—and new or expanded benefits, which are not. For example, in Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, plaintiffs’ claim was related to the one described in this article: those
plaintiffs successfully sought a reasonable modification to DHS and DOJ practices—legal representation in immigration proceedings, where this article addresses
alternatives to detention—in order to remove access barriers to those hearings for
detained immigrants with mental disabilities. DHS and DOJ argued that granting
plaintiffs’ request “would do much more than remove a barrier to access; it would

Too low a level of generality would nullify the antidiscrimination laws. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301, 301 n.21 (1985) (“The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that
effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are
entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit
may have to be made”; “Antidiscrimination legislation can obviously be emptied of meaning if every
discriminatory policy is ‘collapsed’ into one's definition of what is the relevant benefit.”). But too high
a generality is, the Court warned in the same case, unduly “amorphous.” See id. at 303. See generally
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 14 YALE L.J. 1, 47–48 (2004).
136 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Examples and Resources to Support Criminal Justice Entities in Compliance with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (2017), https://www.ada.gov/cjta.html
[https://perma.cc/4K7Z-X8XF].
137 For an example of such a claim, see Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass.
1997), in which Boston University students with disabilities sought testing and coursework accommodations and waivers of certain degree requirements.
135
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expand the scope of benefits provided to aliens in immigration court.” 138 The district
court’s analysis rejecting the government’s approach was dead on:
[T]hose who are in full possession of their faculties already have the ability
to participate in immigration proceedings or, at least, have the wherewithal
to obtain access. . . . Thus, the provision of a Qualified Representative is
merely the means by which Plaintiffs may exercise the same benefits as
other non-disabled individuals, and not the benefit itself.
Defendants mischaracterize the nature of the benefit Plaintiffs seek. Plaintiffs here seek only to meaningfully participate in their removal proceedings. The opportunity to “examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien's own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the Government” is available to all individuals in immigration proceedings, but is beyond Plaintiffs' reach as a result of their mental
incompetency. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). Thus, the provision of a Qualified Representative is merely the means by which Plaintiffs may exercise
the same benefits as other non-disabled individuals, and not the benefit
itself . . . . Aspiring to a system that allows the mentally incompetent to
similarly participate in the removal proceedings against them is not tantamount to “creating an entirely new system of benefits in immigration.” 139
Similarly, a district court in Fraihat v. ICE held that “the programmatic ‘benefit’
in this context is shared by all class members and is best understood as participation
in the removal process.” 140
As in both of these cases, the program or benefit at issue in this article is the
criminal or immigration proceeding. The reasonable modification claim seeks an
alternative to pretrial incarceration where necessary to avoid the access obstacles
faced by an incarcerated plaintiff with disabilities. The modification is all the more
appropriate because pretrial incarceration is supposed to be in service of criminal/immigration proceedings, but is, in fact, undermining the fairness of those proceedings.

138 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-02211-DMG, 2013 WL 3674492, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
23, 2013). The current federal administration has eliminated this kind of non-statutory use of the word
“alien,” which many people find offensive. Joel Rose, Immigration Agencies Ordered Not To Use Term
‘Illegal Alien’ Under New Biden Policy, NPR (Apr. 19, 2020 2:51 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/04/19/988789487/immigration-agencies-ordered-not-to-use-term-illegalalien-under-new-biden-polic [https://perma.cc/T3EX-SJSM]. We use the terms “immigrant” or “noncitizen” except when directly quoting a statute or regulation.
139 Franco-Gonzalez, 2013 WL 3674492, at *7–8.
140 Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F.Supp.3d 709, 748 (C.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d, 16
F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit neither affirmed nor reversed this approach. Although the
court of appeals rejected the district court’s liability finding in Fraihat, that rejection was based on
evidentiary insufficiency, because “even assuming ‘participation in the removal process’ could fit
within the statutory term ‘benefit,’ plaintiffs have not shown they were deprived of the ability to participate in their immigration proceedings.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 16 F.4th 613, 650
(9th Cir. 2021).
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C. Causation
As stated previously, the argument this article presents is limited. Indeed, it may
be analytically helpful to disavow several other claims. This article is not arguing
that pretrial incarceration of people with disabilities always violates the ADA and/or
the Rehabilitation Act, even if (as will often be true) the experience and impact of
incarceration is worsened by an incarcerated person’s disability. Nor is the article
proposing a remedy of release from any form of incarceration when its conditions
of confinement fail to accommodate disability or otherwise discriminate on account
of disability (such a remedy may be appropriate in some circumstances, but is not
our topic). This article’s argument is limited to pretrial incarceration—pretrial detention related to criminal or immigration proceedings—where the impact of incarceration and its conditions is to deprive a person with a disability of meaningful
access to those criminal or immigration proceedings, because of disability.
Causation is thus central to the analysis: has pretrial incarceration caused a deprivation of meaningful access? But what kind of causation is required? Recall that
both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act expressly require causation. The Rehabilitation Act covers program exclusion/denial/discrimination “solely by reason of . . .
disability,” 141 and the ADA uses similar causal language of “by reason of such disability.” 142
The ADA’s causation requirement is relatively straightforward, in theory if not
necessarily in application: in Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court recently
explained that “by reason of” (like “on account of” and “because of”)
incorporates the ‘simple’ and ‘traditional’ standard of but-for causation.
That form of causation is established whenever a particular outcome
would not have happened ‘but for’ the purported cause. In other words, a
but-for test directs us to change one potential cause at a time and see if the
outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.” 143
The Court emphasized that but-for cause “can be a sweeping standard” because
“[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.” 144
In the Rehabilitation Act, however, Congress used the word “solely.” 145 In the
decision just quoted, Bostock, the Court suggested that a statutory requirement of

29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
143 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (citations omitted).
144 Id.
145 Moreover, in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Congress stated that employment
discrimination claims under Section 504 should use “the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501
through 504, and 510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12204 and
12210), as such sections relate to employment.” Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 502, 106 Stats 4344, 4424, and
4428 (amending Section 504), was intended to eliminate any disadvantageous differences between
Section 504 and the other statutes cited—including, presumably, any higher causal standard. See 138
Cong. Rec. S16610 (Oct. 5, 1992) (remarks by Sen. Dole that amendment integrates disability policy
into the philosophy and goals of the ADA); 138 Cong. Rec. S16610 (Oct. 5, 1992) (remarks by Sen.
Harkin reciting that ADA standards are applicable, including “because of” language). But the 1992
change applies only to employment claims, not other Section 504 claims such as this article’s topic.
141
142
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sole causation constitutes “a more parsimonious approach,” “indicat[ing] that actions taken ‘because’ of the confluence of multiple factors do not violate the law.” 146
Courts have struggled to give content to the idea of sole causation, but some principles have emerged: First, the word “solely” does not require a discriminatory motive,
animus, or ill-will. Second, “solely” cannot eviscerate the statute’s reach. In a bankruptcy case, for example, the Supreme Court explained both requirements:
[W]hen the statute refers to failure to pay a debt as the sole cause of cancellation (“solely because”), it cannot reasonably be understood to include,
among the other causes whose presence can preclude application of the
prohibition, the governmental unit's motive in effecting the cancellation.
Such a reading would deprive § 525 of all force. It is hard to imagine a
situation in which a governmental unit would not have some further motive behind the cancellation—assuring the financial solvency of the licensed entity, or punishing lawlessness, or even (quite simply) making itself financially whole. Section 525 means nothing more or less than that
the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause
of the cancellation—the act or event that triggers the agency's decision to
cancel, whatever the agency's ultimate motive in pulling the trigger may
be. 147
These principles dictate the same result here: whatever “solely” means in intentional discrimination cases under the Rehabilitation Act, the statutory causation requirement does not eliminate the type of reasonable modification liability authoritatively approved in Choate, in which an individual seeks a softening of a generally
applicable rule in order to assure meaningful access to a government program. 148 In
any such case, after all, the government’s refusal to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability could be said to serve its interest in uniformity, or in avoiding the costs of
accommodation. To deem such concomitant interests liability-vitiating “causes”
would contradict the statute and Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the right interpretation of the statute’s causation language is that it requires attention to “rules . . .
that hurt [people with disabilities] by reason of their handicap, rather than that hurt
them solely by virtue of what they have in common with other people.” 149

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 525; 16 U.S.C. § 511).
F.C.C. v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns, 537 U.S. 293, 301–02 (2003).
148 See, e.g., Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-02211-DMG, 2013 WL 3674492, at *4–6
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). As this opinion explains, the federal government argued that the plaintiffs—
detained immigrants with mental disabilities were “not denied access [to their removal proceedings]
‘solely by reason’ of their disability because the Government does not intend to prevent them from full
participation in their removal proceedings.” The district court rejected this argument as irreconcilable
with Alexander v. Choate’s “meaningful access” theory of Rehabilitation Act liability.
149 Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Good Shephard Manor
Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir.2003)).
146
147
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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACT

A. Reasonable Modification, Not Fundamental Alteration
Section II.B.2, above, set out the “reasonable modification”/“fundamental alteration” dichotomy and its case law. Here, we apply the standard, demonstrating that
release from pretrial incarceration constitutes a reasonable modification rather than
a fundamental alteration of the criminal/immigration proceedings, when such incarceration prevents meaningful participation in a criminal or immigration case and incustody conditions modifications cannot correct the problem.
A preliminary point: allowing someone to defend their criminal or immigration
case from the community is less expensive than detention.150 But even if that were
not the case, budgetary concerns are relevant to ADA/Rehabilitation Act adjudication, but “financial constraints alone cannot sustain a fundamental alteration defense.” 151
Rather, following the lead of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, in which the Supreme
Court modeled application of the “fundamental alteration” defense, the appropriate
focus is on the purpose of the affected program. 152 In the Martin case, the Court
carefully assessed the purpose of the challenged rule and the affected program using
intensive fact analysis 153 and concluded that the ADA required the sponsor of professional golf events to jettison its rule disallowing player use of a golf cart, because
the “walking rule” was not “such an essential aspect of the game of golf that [alteration] would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors equally,” and because eliminating the rule for a player with a disability did not “give a disabled
player . . . an advantage over others and, for that reason, fundamentally alter the
character of the competition. 154
A similarly careful evaluation of the purpose of pretrial incarceration and court
proceedings, criminal or immigration, demonstrates that release, perhaps with an
alternative supervision method, is far from a “fundamental alteration” of the relevant
program—court proceedings. The purpose of the proceedings is to determine guilt
or innocence in a criminal context, and whether or not someone will be removed
from the United States in an immigration one. Pretrial incarceration is not essential
to the proceedings or the purpose. The most important fact supporting this conclusion is that for both criminal and immigration pretrial incarceration, a vast number
of people go through their proceedings while free and living in their communities.

150 See The Price of Jails, VERA INSTITUTE (May 2015), https://www.vera.org/publications/theprice-of-jails-measuring-the-taxpayer-cost-of-local-incarceration
[https://perma.cc/K5GS-N6M6].
Detention is more expensive than release even if the would-be detained person is placed in subject to
supervision in the community. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 18
(2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7SQ-SC58] (finding that alternatives to detention cost $10.55 a day compared to $158 for detention for people in the immigration
system).
151 Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 324 (4th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).
152 PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
153 Id. at 682–91.
154 Id. at 682–83.
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Even among felony defendants, for example, the last data available (from 2007) suggests that only a minority are subjected to pretrial detention. 155 (Given the past decade’s reforms, 156 that minority is likely smaller now.) Misdemeanor defendants, who
constitute a large majority of arrestees, are still more unlikely to be detained prior to
conviction or acquittal. 157 And for immigration detention, at any given time, the nondetained docket significantly overshadows the detained docket. 158 Indeed, for many
individuals, the incarcerating authorities themselves have already determined that
release would be appropriate (and a fortiori, entirely consistent with the “essential
aspect[s]” of court proceedings). These are individuals who are granted bond but
cannot pay it. 159 It would be odd to find that releasing someone from incarceration
pursuant to the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act alters an essential aspect of pretrial
incarceration when it simply moves them into an existing enormous set of people
facing criminal or immigration proceedings from the community.
In both criminal and immigration contexts, pretrial incarceration is justified as
furthering one or both of two purposes: ensuring that defendants/respondents attend
155 For statistics on pretrial criminal detention of felony defendants, see, for example, THOMAS H.
COHEN, PH.D & BRIAN A. REAVES, PH.D, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEIN
STATE
COURTS
(2007),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf
FENDANTS
[https://perma.cc/M9EX-EV24] (“From 1990 to 2004, an estimated 62% of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties were released prior to the disposition of their case.”). They also constitute
the majority of people in jail at any given point.
156 For an overview of the state of bail reform, see generally Beatrix Lockwood & Annaliese
Griffin, The State of Bail Reform, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/30/the-state-of-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/RWW6-MEJE].
157 See, e.g., Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences
of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 732–33 (2017) (summarizing available data
based on the authors’ calculations: “[i]n New York City, . . . 14% of misdemeanor defendants remain
in jail during the entire pretrial period . . .”). Misdemeanant defendants make up the vast majority of
people in the criminal legal system, though a minority of those in jail. See COURT STATS. PROJECT,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2018 DATA, 13 (2020),
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40820/2018-Digest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AW55-VQLU] (misdemeanor cases constituted over three-quarters of the criminal
docket in the 32 state courts where data were available); MINTON & ZENG, supra note 1, at 11 tbl. 6 (at
midyear 2020, about 77% of local jail inmates were held pursuant to felony charges; 17% pursuant to
misdemeanor charges; 6% pursuant to civil infractions or unknown charges).
158 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FISCAL YEAR
2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 4 (2019), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJC5-NH9P] (noting
that there were more than 3 million cases on the non-detained docket in fiscal year 2019, a far higher
number than those detained and in immigration proceedings).
159 See, e.g., Will Dobbie, Crystal Yang & Jacob Goldin, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM.
ECON. REV. 201, 202 (2018) (reporting, in a study focusing on Miami and Philadelphia, that less than
50% of defendants managed to post bail even when it was set at $5000 or less); MARY T. PHILLIPS,
N.Y.C CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 51 tbl. 7 (2012),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/DecadeBailResearch12.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8KV-LCD9] (reporting that in New York City, only 26% of defendants who received bail under $500 posted bail at
arraignment, while only 7% made bail that was set at $5,000). For information on ICE immigration
bonds and how many detained noncitizens cannot pay them, see ACLU ANALYTICS & IMMIGRANTS'
RIGHTS PROJECT, DISCRETIONARY DETENTION BY THE NUMBERS (2018), https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/discretionary-detention
[https://perma.cc/4RY7-TA4H]; ACLU ANALYTICS, IMMIGRATION BOND ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY
(2018),
https://www.aclu.org/report/immigration-bond-analysis-methodology
[https://perma.cc/V4X2-C4X5].
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their proceedings and safeguarding public safety. 160 Begin with the first justification,
ensuing attendance. Other tools—tools that do not undermine the meaningful and
equal access of people with disabilities to their proceedings—can serve that same
end. Non-detention methods of ensuring presence are extremely common. Among
the methods used with many thousands of criminal defendants are release on recognizance, bail, electronic monitoring of various types, and pretrial check-ins (in person, via phone, or via text). The experience of states and the federal government
demonstrates these processes can be effective in getting defendants to their criminal
court proceedings. 161 Similarly, the federal government has ample tools at its disposal short of detention to ensure immigration proceeding attendance by non-detained people. These include release on recognizance, parole, bond, periodic checkins, and electronic monitoring. 162 Without necessarily endorsing all of these options
(ankle monitors and invasive check-ins in particular may be very onerous for people
with disabilities), we note that they are in very wide use; 163 millions of people appear
for immigration proceedings without being detained. 164 And (as developed in Section IV.C, below), this is true even for many individuals covered by the Immigration
and Nationality Act’s so-called “mandatory detention” provisions.
160 On criminal detention, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (recognizing that the
“Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for
trials and, ultimately, for service of their sentences, [and] confinement of such persons pending trial is
a legitimate means of furthering that interest”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987)
(upholding pretrial detention “[w]hen the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that
an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community”). Contrast
this with post-adjudication incarceration, where the purpose is punishment. On immigration detention,
see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 515 (2003) (crediting “the Government's two principal justifications
for mandatory detention [of “criminal aliens”]: (1) ensuring the presence of criminal aliens at their
removal proceedings; and (2) protecting the public from dangerous criminal aliens”); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018) (“Congress has authorized immigration officials to detain some
classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration proceedings” to allow “immigration officials
time to determine an alien’s status without running the risk of the alien’s either absconding or engaging
in criminal activity before a final decision can be made”).
161 MICHAEL R. JONES, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., UNSECURED BONDS: THE AS EFFECTIVE AND MOST
EFFICIENT PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION (2013), https://www.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Unsecured_Bonds_The_As_Effective_and_Most_Efficient_Pretrial_Release_Option_Jones_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/57F8-ANXU] (finding that unsecured bonds are as effective as
secured bonds); Karla Dhungana Sainju, Stephanie Fahy, Katherine Baggaley, Ashley Baker, Tamar
Minassian & Vanessa Filippelli, Electronic Monitoring for Pretrial Release: Assessing the Impact, 82
FED. PROB. 3, 9 (2018) (finding that “the use of [electronic monitoring] may have some positive impacts
such as increasing the likelihood of returning to court”); ROSS HATTON & JESSICA SMITH, UNIV. OF N.C.
SCH. OF GOV’T, RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRETRIAL SUPPORT AND SUPERVISION SERVICES:
A GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS (2021) (finding that existing literature on alternatives to
pretrial detention suggests pretrial court date reminder systems, electronic monitoring, and supervised
release can reduce failure to appear rates). See also, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:162-15 (2014) (implementing New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act to primarily rely on pretrial release to assure a criminal defendant’s appearance in court).
162 For details on ICE’s “alternatives to detention,” see Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS
ENF’T,
https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management
(Jul.
8,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/T8M9-M8CU].
163 See Immigration Detention Quick Facts: Immigration Detention Primer, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(2021), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/quickfacts/ [https://perma.cc/LRB2-WJSP] (164,391 people
were monitored in ICE’s various alternatives to detention programs as of Jan. 15, 2022).
164 See FACT CHECK: Asylum Seekers Regularly Attend Immigration Court Hearings, HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/fact-check-asylum-seekersregularly-attend-immigration-court-hearings [https://perma.cc/T5SE-73DT].
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Sometimes, a further purpose of pretrial incarceration is to safeguard public
safety. (As already explained, pretrial incarceration often does not actually even purport to serve public safety, because it occurs after an incarcerated individual has
been deemed appropriate for release, when he or she cannot afford bond.) Where the
proffered justification for pretrial incarceration of a particular person with a disability is, indeed, safety-based, if he demonstrates that his incarceration is excluding him
from meaningful access to his criminal or immigration proceedings because of his
disability, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act demand that the government be put to its
proof on any assertion of a “fundamental alteration” defense. 165 And if the government wants to defend the exclusion as necessary for public safety (so that alteration
would constitute a “fundamental alteration,” its demonstration would necessarily
turn on individual circumstances and evidence, unlike so many bond determinations
that rest on generalizations purporting to suggest dangerousness. 166
Moreover, the requirement that the government make an individualized showing
of dangerousness is even sharper if an incarcerating authority has chosen to subject
a person with a disability to pretrial incarceration because of that disability—if, for
example, a bond schedule or bond decider weighs mental illness against bond on the
stereotyped assumption that people with mental illness are dangerous, or particularly
likely to abscond. Such a discriminatory practice constitutes its own violation of the
ADA/Rehabilitation Act unless the jurisdiction succeeds in proving up the existence
of a “direct threat”—a “determin[ation that] an individual poses a direct threat to the
health or safety of others, [founded on] an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available
objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the
probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or
services will mitigate the risk.” 167

165 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Cf. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
401–02 (interpreting ADA Title I “reasonable accommodation” provision: plaintiff “need only show
that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases,” “[o]nce
the plaintiff has made this showing, the defendant/employer then must show special (typically casespecific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances”); Johnson v.
Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying similar analysis to
ADA Title III’s fundamental alteration defense, and commenting “fundamental alteration is merely a
particular type of undue hardship. Consequently, while the scope of the affirmative defense under Title
III is more narrow than that provided by Title I, the type of proof—that is, proof focusing on the specific
circumstances rather than on reasonableness in general—is the same.”).
166 See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 837, 866–71.
167 28 C.F.R. § 35.139; see also Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987)
(interpreting the Rehabilitation Act to disallow a teacher’s firing unless she “pose[d] a significant risk
of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace [and a] reasonable accommodation
will not eliminate that risk”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (“The direct
threat defense must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence.’”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649
(1998) (“[T]he risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence.”); see generally
Brittany Glidden & Laura Rovner, Requiring the State to Justify Supermax Confinement for Mentally
Ill Prisoners: A Disability Discrimination Approach, 90 DEN. U. L. REV. 56, 69 (2012); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act As Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1490–
1513 (2001).
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B. Existing Programs Are Not Adequate Substitutes
Release is not the only possible response to the damaging interaction of pretrial
incarceration and disability. States and the federal government have long provided
two other interventions for (some) individuals with psychiatric and intellectual disabilities—provision of counsel, and treatment to restore competency—to address
potential unfairness of the ongoing court proceedings. Neither covers the ground
we’ve described and, therefore, neither crowds out our theory.

1. Counsel
Many, but far from all, people detained pretrial have counsel. For criminal defendants, the (eventually) counseled percentage must be fairly high—after all, criminal defendants may not be sentenced to a term of incarceration, including a suspended term, without criminal counsel. 168 But many months may pass prior to appointment. 169 The proportion is far lower in immigration detention, 170 where the
government has a much more limited obligation to fund representation. 171 But where
detained people have counsel, or if access to counsel were broadened, could legal
representation substitute for the alternatives-to-detention modification proposed
here? Our answer is no. Counsel are surely important, for all the reasons stated in
the foundational cases guaranteeing counsel rights for criminal defendants. 172 But
for access to criminal or immigration proceedings to be meaningful/equal, those in
such proceedings need to be able to themselves participate, by testifying, identifying
witnesses and evidence, assisting their counsel, and making decisions about their
case—all abilities that decay under the stresses that prompted this article. If detention thus renders access unequal, our claim remains even for counseled clients.
In the immigration setting, the 2011 Board of Immigration Appeals decision
Matter of MAM requires immigration judges to be alert to the possibility of mental
incompetency, and where they see it, to provide “safeguards.” 173
Examples of appropriate safeguards include, but are not limited to, refusal to
accept an admission of removability from an unrepresented respondent; identification and appearance of a family member or close friend who can assist the respond-

168 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
169 See, e.g., DIANE DEPIETROPAOLO-PRICE, ACLU, SUMMARY INJUSTICE: A LOOK AT CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA’S SUMMARY COURTS (2016), https://www.aclu.org/report/summary-injustice-exposes-south-carolina-courts-convict-and-jail-many-defendants-without
[https://perma.cc/CKQ3-KDHF].
170 See, e.g., Marouf, supra note 4, at 2150 (“In removal proceedings overall, forty-five percent of
immigrants are unrepresented; but a 2007 study found that eighty-four percent of detainees did not
have attorneys.”).
171 See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (requiring provision of
legal representation to detained immigrants in California, Arizona, and Washington, if their mental
disabilities render them unable to represent themselves).
172 See sources cited supra note 168.
173 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011) (available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/25/3711.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY4E-6H52]).
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ent and provide the court with information; docketing or managing the case to facilitate the respondent’s ability to obtain legal representation and/or medical treatment
in an effort to restore competency; participation of a guardian in the proceedings;
continuance of the case for good cause shown; closing the hearing to the public;
waiving the respondent’s appearance; actively aiding in the development of the record, including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses; and reserving
appeal rights for the respondent. 174
The literature demonstrating the inadequacy of Matter of MAM safeguards in
mitigating incompetency is voluminous and persuasive. 175 But even if immigration
court safeguards were protecting the due process rights of people with competency
limitations, that goal is different from what the Rehabilitation Act promises. While
the Rehabilitation Act covers all people with disabilities, Matter of MAM safeguards
are available only to the subset who lack a “rational and factual understanding of the
nature and object of the proceedings” and cannot “consult with the attorney or representative.” Even then, Matter of MAM promises only minimal access in immigration court, not an equal opportunity to benefit from immigration proceedings. The
Rehabilitation Act guarantees more.

2. Restoration of Competency
Every state, and the federal government, has a system in place to evaluate and
seek to “restore” competency of any criminal defendant thought to be incompetent
to stand trial—that is, under Dusky v. United States, who lacks “sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.” 176 (No such restoration process is used in immigration proceedings. 177)
In practice, competency restoration systems are vastly under-resourced, and experts have cataloged the systems’ many failings. 178 Individuals who spend months
in hospitals receiving support to restore their competency may ultimately return
from those hospitals with little change to their ability to understand the proceedings
against them or work with their counsel. But even where competency restoration
systems are functional and succeed in some degree of competency improvement,
Id. at 483.
See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 961–64 (2014); Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Sufficiently Safeguarded? Competency Evaluations of Mentally Ill Respondents in Removal Proceedings,
67 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (2016).
176 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
177 See Sarah Sherman-Stokes, No Restoration, No Rehabilitation: Shadow Detention of Mentally
Incompetent Noncitizens, 62 VILL. L. REV. 787, 790 (2017).
178 See, e.g., Lisa Callahan & Debra A. Pinals, Challenges to Reforming the Competence to Stand
Trial and Competence Restoration System, 71 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 691 (2020); Debra A. Pinals & Lisa
Callahan, Evaluation and Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial: Intercepting the Forensic System
Using the Sequential Intercept Model, 71 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 698 (2020); Reena Kapoor, Commentary: Jail-Based Competency Restoration, 39 J. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & THE Law 311 (2011). See
also, e.g., Disability L. Ctr. v. Utah, 180 F. Supp. 3d 998 (D. Utah 2016); Trueblood v. Washington
State Dep’t of Social & Health Servs., No. 14-cv-1178-MJP, 2017 WL 4700326 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19,
2017); Oregon Advoc. Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2002). For litigation summaries of these
three complex cases, see, respectively, http://clearinghouse.net/case/16833/ [https://perma.cc/5GWFTS58];
http://clearinghouse.net/case/18576/
[https://perma.cc/9F6T-XGLU];
http://clearinghouse.net/case/15314/ [https://perma.cc/RU9G-7CPW].
174
175
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they safeguard the constitutional minima—due process rights of criminal defendants—not the antidiscrimination rights created by the Rehabilitation Act and ADA
Title II. 179 The antidiscrimination statutes are not coincident with the constitutional
law they implement; rather, as the Supreme Court has explained, they are broader,
acting prophylactically to prevent, deter, and remedy constitutional violations. 180
And as established above, “meaningful access” does not mean “minimal access,”
but rather equal opportunity—a more plaintiff-friendly standard than Dusky and its
progeny require.
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The ADA/Rehabilitation Act anti-discrimination rights 181 we’ve been writing
about could be implemented in any number of ways. In many jurisdictions, prose-

179 See Mary Elizabeth Wood, Katherine M Lawson, Jaime L Anderson, Dominique I. Kinney,
Stephen Nitch & David M Glassmire, Reasonable Accommodations for Meeting the Unique Needs of
Defendants with Intellectual Disability, 47 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 310, 311, 313–19 (2019)
(urging implementation of ADA reasonable modifications to criminal court systems to supplement
competency restoration).
180 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
181 The federal government is not covered by the ADA, but the Rehabilitation Act is sufficient.
There is no damages cause of action against the federal government under the Rehabilitation Act. See
Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187 (1996). But prospective relief can be enforced under an implied cause of
action or by way of an Administrative Procedures Act, or in habeas. For a convincing analysis of this
issue, see Mendez v. Gearan, 947 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1996). For opinions endorsing the existence
of an implied cause of action, see, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Trump, 486 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C.
2020); Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d and remanded
sub nom. Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Avila v. FCI Berlin,
No. 19-cv-104, 2020 WL 4506727 (D.N.H. Apr. 7, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020
WL 4504902 (Aug. 4, 2020); Gray v. Licon-Vitale, No. 3:19-cv-1291, 2020 WL 1532307 (D. Conn.
Mar. 31, 2020); Yeh v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:18-cv-943, 2019 WL 3564697 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
6, 2019); Collins v. Pigos, No. 1:12-cv-232, 2013 WL 943119 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2013); Deron Sch.
of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 09-cv-3477, 2012 WL 1079068 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012); Hawk
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:18-cv-1768, 2019 WL 4439705 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4439883 (Sept. 16, 2019); Washington v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
No. 5:16-cv-03913, 2019 WL 2125246 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2019), report and recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 1349516 (Mar. 26, 2019); Hopper v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 5:18-cv-01223, 2018 WL
3750553 (D.S.C. July 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3744981 (Aug. 7,
2018); McRaniels v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 15-cv-802, 2017 WL 2259622 (W.D. Wis. May
19, 2017); Payne v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 15-cv-5970, 2018 WL 3496094 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2018);
Houck v. USA, No. 17-cv-474, 2017 WL 2733905 (S.D. Ill. June 22, 2017); Keller v. Walton, No. 16CV-565, 2016 WL 4720459 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2016); Arkansas Adapt v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 1186 (8th
Cir. 1998); Wood v. Smith, No. 2:17-cv-137, 2018 WL 1613799 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 12, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1610878 (Apr. 3, 2018); Am. Council of the Blind v. Astrue, No.
05-cv-04696, 2008 WL 1858928 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2008); Mendez v. Gearan, 947 F.Supp. 1364
(N.D. Cal.1996); Davis v. Astrue, No. 06-cv-6108, 2011 WL 3651064 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011); Gray
v. Golden Gate Nat’l Recreational Area, No. 08-cv-00722, 2012 WL 13140460 (N.D. Cal. July 3,
2012); Doe v. Astrue, No. 09-cv-00980, 2009 WL 2566720 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); Galvez-Letona
v. Kirkpatrick, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 3 F. App’x 829 (10th Cir.
2001); Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Johnson v. United States,
No. 3:18-cv-2178, 2021 WL 256811 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021); Wenrich v. Empowered Mgmt. Sols.
LLC, No. 17-cv-00639, 2019 WL 3550835 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2019). For opinions endorsing an APA
cause of action, see, e.g., Cousins v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 880 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
1989) (en banc); Clark v. Skinner, 937 F.2d 123, 126 (4th Cir. 1991); Moya v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 975 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Nor does the statute reflect Congress’s intent to imply a private
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cutors and/or jailers have authority to release criminal defendants in appropriate circumstances. When executive officials have this kind of authority, they should—and
indeed must, to comply with federal law—exercise it to vindicate the antidiscrimination rights of people with disabilities in their custody. So a first step in cases raising the fact patterns here examined is for the person whose access to court proceedings is being undermined by the interaction of incarceration and disability to—
through his or her lawyer, if there is one—raise the issue with the executive official
responsible for incarceration, explain the situation, and seek administrative release.
Which officials have appropriate authority, and the procedural avenues to reach
them, will vary by incarcerating jurisdiction. For example, detained noncitizens in
immigration proceedings might raise their Rehabilitation Act right to release in a
written letter to their local ICE Field Office Director, or as part of a motion for release on bond submitted to an Executive Office of Immigration Review immigration
judge. In the authors’ experiences, government officials often lack any background
in disability rights, and are often unwilling to vary their normal procedures notwithstanding their reasonable modification responsibilities. So self-advocates and lawyers must be ready to explain thoroughly why and how the official at hand must act
to prevent disability discrimination. If that doesn’t work, other venues could include
the proceedings for which pretrial incarceration is being used, or in a federal court
ADA/Rehabilitation Act enforcement action brought as a habeas petition, or—if it’s
possible to navigate the Prison Litigation Reform Act obstacles discussed below—
as an injunctive case. 182
We cannot deal comprehensively with the hurdles to be managed for each procedural avenue, but we do address three groups of considerations in this Part. First,
we lay out the obstacles posed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act and some potential paths through them; then, we address what we think is the non-issue of Younger
abstention, and, finally, we survey the bevy of statutory complications in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

right of action against executive agencies as regulators”; “[T]he APA provides an express cause of
action for plaintiffs who wish to sue an executive agency for violating the Rehabilitation Act”); Kinneary v. City of New York, 358 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Wilson v. Seattle Hous. Auth.,
No. 09-cv-226-MJP, 2010 WL 1633323, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2010) (“HUD argues more convincingly . . . that Plaintiffs can only sue for Rehabilitation Act relief under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).”); SAI v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 149 F. Supp. 3d 99, 115 (D.D.C. 2015); Pereira
v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 16-cv-2599-NRB, 2016 WL 2745850, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2016);
Mathis v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00021, 2009 WL 10736631, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2009)
(“Notably, the APA may provide for judicial review of the BOP’s alleged action and thereby undercut
the need to imply a private right of action against the BOP under section 504.”).
182 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184–85 (2002) (“Section 202 of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled by public entities; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal funding, including private organizations, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(b)(3). Both provisions are enforceable through private causes of action.”).
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A. State and Federal Criminal Incarceration: The Prison Litigation
Reform Act 183
Anyone bringing a federal civil case involving criminal 184 (not immigration) incarceration needs to worry about the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act, 185 a statute
that limits access to courts for incarcerated people and constrains the remedies available in the cases they do manage to bring. 186
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The PLRA requires incarcerated people
bringing federal lawsuits to first pursue internal jail/prison grievance systems. It
states: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 187 Although the Supreme Court has been clear that exhaustion is not
required when no remedy at all is available via the grievance system, 188 there is no
exemption from the requirement just because the preferred remedy is unavailable. 189
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the PLRA imposes not just a ripenesstype timing rule but a procedural bar—exhaustion must be not merely complete but
“proper,” following all jail-imposed rules, such as time limits, use of specified
forms, etc. 190 The PLRA exhaustion requirement has functioned to narrow access to
courts because following the (often unclear, internally contradictory, or onerous)
rules can be extremely difficult, particularly for incarcerated people with communications or intellectual disabilities or with mental illness.
One approach to PLRA exhaustion is to avoid it—that is, to choose procedural
vehicles for ADA/Rehabilitation Act enforcement that lie outside of the PLRA exhaustion requirement. For example, assertion of ADA/Rehabilitation Act rights in

183 We lean heavily in this subpart on JOHN BOSTON, THE PLRA HANDBOOK: LAW AND PRACTICE
UNDER THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (2022).
184 See, e.g., Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (immigration detainees);
LaFontant v. I.N.S., 135 F.3d 158, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Ojo v. I.N.S., 106 F.3d 680, 683 (5th
Cir. 1997) (same); Cohen v. Clemens, 321 Fed. Appx. 739, 743 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).
185 Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 77 (1996) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2012); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a–c, e–f, h (2012)). The PLRA was part of the
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat.
1321.
186 For in-depth examination of the PLRA’s impact on damage actions, see Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003). For in-depth examination of the PLRA’s impact on
injunctive litigation, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail
and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006). For statistics on the statute’s impact, see
Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, As the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
153 (2015), and an update posted as Margo Schlanger, Prison and Jail Civil Rights/Conditions Cases:
Longitudinal Statistics, 1970-2021 (April 16, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4085142
[https://perma.cc/KP39-685C].
187 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
188 See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642–46 (2016).
189 See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
190 See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
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criminal/bond proceedings is not an “action brought with respect to prison conditions.” 191 Habeas actions may well also be excluded 192 because they are subject to
their own exhaustion requirements (beyond the ambit of this article), and because
courts have interpreted the exhaustion provision’s reach with reference to the
PLRA’s prospective relief provisions, which cover “any civil action with respect to
prison conditions,” 193 and define that term expressly to exclude “habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.” 194 Finally, because only cases brought by “prisoner[s]” are covered, claims in cases brought by
an incarcerated person’s family or guardian, or by an organization (such as one of
the federally-funded disability-focused Protection and Advocacy organizations)
need not have exhausted grievance systems prior to filing. 195
There’s also a more general argument that exhaustion does not apply because a
case hinging on denial of equal access to criminal proceedings is not one “brought
with respect to prison conditions.” In Porter v. Nussle, the Court rejected lower court
precedent that the exhaustion provision’s reference to “action[s] . . . brought with
respect to prison conditions” did not limit single-incident or excessive force cases;
it held that the exhaustion requirement covers conditions suits, “whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” 196 In so doing, the Porter Court pointed to Preiser
v. Rodriguez, which, it explained, “described [the] two broad categories of prisoner
petitions: (1) those challenging the fact or duration of confinement itself; and (2)
those challenging the conditions of confinement.” 197 Because claims asserting this

See, e.g., United States v. Hashimi, 621 F.Supp. 2d 76, 84–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that a
motion by a detainee in a government-initiated criminal case is not an “action” covered by PLRA exhaustion); United States v. Savage, 2012 WL 5866059, *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012) (no exhaustion
required for motions that “affect[] Defendant’s ability to prepare his defense”).
192 See Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001), and cases cited;
Baez v. Moniz, 460 F.Supp.3d 78, 82–83 (D. Mass. 2020) (holding PLRA exhaustion inapplicable to
habeas proceeding seeking release based on prison conditions); Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459
F.Supp.3d 411, 437 n.19 (D. Conn. 2020) (same). Note, however, that in some but not all circuits,
habeas is disallowed as a vehicle for conditions-related challenges. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1862–63 (“We have left open the question whether [detainees] might be able to challenge their
confinement conditions via a petition for a write of habeas corpus.”); Hallinan v. Scarantino, 466
F.Supp. 3d 587, 601–02 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (collecting lower court cases on both sides of the question).
Whether the challenge described here would count as too “conditions-related” for habeas is unclear. If
habeas is available, as stated in text, the PLRA by its terms does not apply to “habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.” In our view, the challenge described,
if brought under habeas, aligns with this description and therefore should be exempt from the PLRA.
But—in the context of COVID claims brought in the past several years—courts are, again, all over the
map. Compare, e.g., Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F.Supp.3d 411, with, e.g., Alvarez v. Larose, 456
F. Supp. 3d 861, 866 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (holding PLRA applicable to Eighth Amendment habeas case
seeking release based on COVID-risk).
193 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
194 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
195 See, e.g., Rivera-Rodriguez v. Pereira-Castillo, No. 04–cv–1389, 2005 WL 290160, at *5–6
(D.P.R. Jan. 31, 2005) (prisoner’s guardian); Ala. Disabilities Advoc. Program v. Wood, 584 F. Supp.
2d 1314, 1316 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (state Protection and Advocacy organization).
196 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
197 Id.
191
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article’s theory challenge “the fact or duration of confinement,” the Preiser divide
might exclude them from PLRA exhaustion coverage. 198

1. Prisoner Release Orders
As mentioned above, the PLRA limits prospective remedies in “any civil action
with respect to prison conditions.” This is defined as “any civil proceeding arising
under Federal law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of
actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison, but does
not include habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.” 199 (“Prison” is further defined to include pretrial detention. 200)
The prospective relief limits, which require provisions to be closely tailored and
necessary to correct the federal law violation, 201 merely reflect general equitable
principles, but their codification has clearly made courts more attentive to those ideals of restraint. 202 More drastically, the PLRA applies the same requirements to consent judgments, which otherwise can include whatever provisions the parties chose
to agree to, as long as they had a visible relationship to the complaint. 203 More importantly, the statute makes it something between difficult and impossible to obtain
a “prisoner release order” 204—that is, an order “that directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison.” 205 Such an order can be granted only if “(i) a
court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied through the prisoner
release order; and (ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply
with the previous court orders,” and only after a three-judge court finds (by clear
and convincing evidence) that “(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of
a Federal right; and (ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal
right.” 206 Defendants may appeal any prisoner release order, as of right, directly to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 207
It’s for this reason that false arrest and wrongful conviction cases are not covered by PLRA
exhaustion. See, e.g., Cantu v. Bexar Cnty., No. SA-17-CA-306, 2018 WL 1419345 (W.D. Tex. Mar.
22, 2018), and other cases cited by JOHN BOSTON, THE PLRA HANDBOOK: LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 117 n.205 (2022). On the other hand, some courts have been more
aggressive in their interpretation of the PLRA’s coverage. See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 343
F.3d 756, 761 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that statutorily required collection of DNA is a prison condition);
Martin v. Iowa, 752 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding challenge to lack of in-person parole interviews must be exhausted since it was a “civil action with respect to prison conditions,” citing the definition from 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g), governing another part of the PLRA).
199 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
200 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(5).
201 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).
202 See, e.g., Georgia Advoc. Off. v. Jackson, 4 F.4th 1200, 1209 (11th Cir. 2021), vacated on
other grounds, 33 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating “the PLRA supercharges some of the traditional
equitable principles of injunctive relief”).
203 See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 525 (1986) (stating consent decree terms must only “spring from and serve to resolve a dispute
within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, . . . com[e] within the general scope of the case made by
the pleadings, . . . further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based,” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
204 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3); See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
205 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4).
206 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3).
207 Id.
198
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If the PLRA’s limits on prisoner release orders apply to the kind of remedy urged
here—an order directing that a person with a disability not be incarcerated because
that incarceration undermines equal access to a court proceeding—those limits
might well pose an insurmountable barrier. But, as with exhaustion, there are occasions when the release order provisions should not apply. As with exhaustion, the
statute does not cover immigration detention. And, again, even as to criminal detention, the prisoner release order provisions simply have no application to criminal
proceedings (including bond/bail hearings). 208 (Their application to habeas cases is
currently highly contested.)
When the PLRA covers a particular action, an order releasing prisoners from
incarceration whose purpose is to limit population is certainly constrained. But some
courts have held that orders serving other purposes are not. For example, an order
banning the housing of juveniles in a jail for more than 15 days, entered because the
jail’s conditions were unacceptable for children, has been held not to be a prisoner
release order. 209 Likewise an order directing transfer of a quadriplegic prisoner to a
civilian medical facility when the court concluded his care was so inadequate in
prison that he would die if left there. 210 The district court explained that, when Congress limited entry of a prisoner release order to cases in which “crowding is the
primary cause of the violation of a Federal right,” it signaled that orders implementing other constitutional rights and entirely unrelated to crowding were not covered
by this PLRA provision. 211

B. State Criminal Cases: Younger Abstention
The Supreme Court held in Younger v. Harris that when a party in federal court
is simultaneously defending a state criminal prosecution, federal courts “should not
act to restrain [the state] criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” 212 But such “Younger abstention” does not cover the theory presented here. In
Pugh v. Rainwater, the Fifth Circuit explained that Younger abstention does not bar
federal court adjudication of “procedural rights” if the plaintiff “seeks to challenge
an aspect of the criminal justice system which adversely affects him but which cannot be vindicated in the state court trial.” “Where . . . the relief sought is not ‘against

208

See supra note 192.

209 Doe v. Younger, No. 91-cv-187, Op. and Order at 10–12 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 4, 1996), https://clear-

inghouse.net/doc/105408/ [https://perma.cc/J8P4-97X2].
210 Reaves v. Dep't of Corr., 404 F.Supp.3d 520, 522–23 (D.Mass. 2019) (noting that the order
called for transfer, not release; that it involved only a single prisoner; and that it was not primarily
intended to relieve crowding), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 19-2089 (1st Cir., Dec. 14, 2021). See
also Plata v. Brown, 427 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1222 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Defendants conceded that an order
to transfer any single inmate out of a prison to correct the violation of a constitutional right caused by
something other than crowding—for example, because transfer was necessary for the inmate to obtain
appropriate medical care—would not be a ‘prisoner release order.’”).
211 Reaves, 404 F.Supp.3d at 523. Schlanger has similarly argued in prior work that court orders
whose purpose is protection, not population reduction—for example, orders “diverting classes of vulnerable persons from incarceration”—are not PLRA prisoner release orders. See Margo Schlanger,
Anti-Incarcerative Remedies for Illegal Conditions of Confinement, 6 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L.
REV. 1, 27–28 (2016).
212 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).
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any pending or future court proceedings as such,’ Younger is inapplicable.” 213 Thus,
Younger dictates abstention when a state court defendant challenges the merits of
his criminal prosecution in federal court—for example, attempting to suppress the
evidence presented in state court based on an unconstitutional search and seizure—
but abstention is inappropriate where a federal case challenges “an aspect of the
criminal justice system which adversely affects” him but is unrelated to the merits
of the prosecution itself. 214
The Supreme Court endorsed this approach in its review of Pugh v. Rainwater,
re-captioned Gerstein v. Pugh, warning against over-abstention. Affirming an injunction ordering the state to provide “timely judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to detention,” 215 the Court noted that Younger abstention was
not appropriate because “[t]he injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions
as such, but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an
issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution,” and because
“[t]he order to hold preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the trial
on the merits.” 216
More generally, the Court has made clear that “a federal court's ‘obligation’ to
hear and decide a case is ‘virtually unflagging.’” 217 The Courts of Appeals have
similarly emphasized that “Younger abstention remains an extraordinary and narrow
exception to the general rule.” 218 In recent years, many federal courts have rejected
Younger abstention arguments to entertain challenges to state court bail procedures,
holding that abstention is incorrect just as in Gerstein. 219 Even in individual cases,
federal courts have granted review and relief relating to unlawful bail proceedings.
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently explained that habeas relief was warranted
in one such case and that “Younger abstention is not appropriate in this case because
the issues raised in the bail appeal are distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution and would not interfere with it. Regardless of how the bail issue is resolved,
the prosecution will move forward unimpeded.” 220

Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 781–82 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1971)).
214 Pugh, 483 F.2d at 782.
215 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 126 (1975).
216 Id. at 108 n.9.
217 Sprint Commc'ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
218 Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nationwide Biweekly Admin.
v. Owen, 873 F.3d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
219 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018); O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty.,
892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018); Parga v. Bd. of Cnty.
Commissioners of Cnty. of Tulsa, No. 18-cv-0298, 2019 WL 1231675 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2019);
Booth v. Galveston Cnty., 352 F. Supp. 3d 718 (S.D. Tex. 2019); Caliste v. Cantrell, No. 17-6197,
2017 WL 3686579 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2017), aff’d 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2019); Little v. Frederick,
No. 17-cv-00724, 2017 WL 8161160 (W.D. La. Dec. 6, 2017), adopted in relevant part, 2018 WL
1221119 (Mar. 8, 2018); Welchen v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. 16-cv-00185, 2016 WL 5930563 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 11, 2016); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn.
2015).
220 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d
543, 549 (6th Cir. 1981) (“The issue of whether the right to bail has been denied is collateral to and
independent of the merits of the case pending against the detainee. . . .”).
213
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In addition, case law emphasizes that Younger itself calls for abstention only
“when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” 221 The absence of a state court forum or the
inability of that state court forum to grant relief before irreparable harm occurs both
dictate non-abstention. 222
While these precedents are currently under attack, 223 while they stand, they compel non-abstention in the circumstances here. A federal lawsuit could seek to vindicate the ADA rights in question in one of two ways. An injunctive case could seek
reform of bail procedures to grant reasonable modifications where required by the
ADA/Rehabilitation Act; such a lawsuit escapes abstention by following in the footsteps of Gerstein and the recent bail-procedure-modification cases. Or, a habeas case
could seek release mandated by the ADA/Rehabilitation Act, if the state proceedings
declined either to consider or grant such release. Such a case likewise escapes abstention on demonstration of the absence of an adequate state remedy at law and/or
the presence of irreparable harm.

C. Immigration Cases
1. Mandatory Detention
A limited number of cases, involving immigration detention of noncitizens subject to so-called statutory “mandatory detention,” present the possibility that our interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act could conflict with (later-in-time) provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 224 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard
each as effective.” 225 Presented with two statutes, courts should harmonize them,
“regard[ing] each as effective”—unless Congress' intention to repeal is “clear and
manifest,” or the two laws are “irreconcilable.” 226
The INA’s “mandatory detention” provision directs the federal government to
“take into custody any alien who [meets certain criteria related to criminal history]
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole,
supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be
arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” 227 Further, it limits subsequent
release of such individuals to circumstances related to witness protection.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 766–67; Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2019).
223 See Daves v. Dallas Cnty., Texas, 22 F.4th 522, 547–48 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (remanding
bail class action for plenary consideration of Younger abstention notwithstanding the rejection of an
analogous claim for abstention in O’Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018), and retaining en banc jurisdiction, noting “After the remand, the en banc court will take a fresh look at Younger,
at which time we will have authority to re-evaluate our own precedent.”).
224 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
225 FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 304 (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also, e.g., Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323
(2020).
226 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188,
198 (1939)).
227 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
221
222

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4205817

2020]

Ending the Discriminatory Pretrial Incarceration of People
with Disabilities

47

However, assuming in a given case that the mandatory detention statute is constitutional—and numerous courts have upheld as-applied challenges under the Due
Process Clause, when detention has become prolonged 228—an interpretation of the
INA consistent with the understanding here offered of the Rehabilitation Act is readily available. The government has long and consistently implemented the statute
with the understanding that it does not override agency discretion to avoid detention
for humanitarian reasons. In a detailed declaration, 229 one former official canvassed
the policies and parameters ICE has used to channel such discretion, 230 and summarized: “Even individuals held under [§ 1226(c)] were released pursuant to ICE’s
guidelines and policies, particularly where the nature of their illness could impose
substantial health care costs or the humanitarian equities mitigating against detention
were particularly compelling.” 231 Concretizing this government understanding, in
case after case, ICE has released noncitizens facing serious medical risks due to immigration detention, deeming those releases lawful even though those individuals
were covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 232
The government has only recently offered much analysis in support of its flexible interpretation of 1226(c). 233 While at least two district courts have found that
interpretation contrary to law, focusing on the statutory use of the word “shall,” 234
the Sixth Circuit has disagreed. 235 It seems to us that flexibility is correct under either
or both of two theories: First, “custody” for purposes of this provision of the INA is

See, e.g., German Santos v. Warden, Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020).
Declaration of Andrew Lorenzen-Strait, Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Case 5:19-cv-01546-JGB-SHK Document 81-14, 92 (Mar. 24, 2020) (available at
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/documents/declarations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/328M4LTY]).
230 Para. 4, n.1 of the Declaration cited, as examples, Detention Reform, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/detention-reform#tabl [https://perma.cc/U4A8-74F7] (last updated
July 24, 2018) (referencing use of risk classification assessment tools that "require[] ICE officers to
determine whether there is any special vulnerability that may impact custody and classification determinations"); ICE ENF’T AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS, DIRECTIVE 11071.1: ASSESSMENT AND ACCOMMODATIONS FOR DETAINEES WITH DISABILITIES 9 (Dec. 15, 2016) (available at https://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-er-directive-detainees-with-disabilities [https://perma.cc/M4S4-274Y] (providing for release
as an option for detainees with disabilities); DORIS MEISSNER, IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERVS.,
EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 11 (Nov. 17, 2000), https://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE54-2DNH])
(citing "aliens with a serious health concern" as a trigger for the favorable exercise of discretion).
231 Declaration of Andrew Lorenzen-Strait, supra note 229, para. 11.
232 See Br. of American Immigr. Council as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pet’rs-Appellees, Hope v.
Warden York Cnty. Prison, No. 20-1784 (3d Cir. 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/amicus_briefs/hope_et_al_v_doll_et_al_amicus_brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LE9H-92C2] (describing such cases).
233 The most sustained defense of which we are aware appears in briefs filed in support of the
Biden Administration’s prioritization policy, in Texas v. United States, No. 6:21-cv-00016; see in particular Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Doc. 42, at 22–24 (May 18,
2021), https://clearinghouse.net/doc/130692/ [https://perma.cc/DC2L-BKGY], and Defs.’ Post-Trial
Mem. of Law, Doc. 223, at 8–19 (Mar. 18, 2022), https://clearinghouse.net/doc/130691/
[https://perma.cc/K4G2-8N3Q].
234 See Texas v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 3d 351 (S.D. Tex. 2021), stay granted, 14 F.4th 332
(5th Cir. 2021), stay vacated, 24 F.4th 407 (5th Cir. 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-40618, 2022 WL
517281 (Feb. 11, 2022); Arizona v. Biden, No. 3:21-cv-314, 2022 WL 839672 (S.D. Ohio, March 22,
2022), stay granted, 31 F.4th 469 (6th Cir. 2022).
235 See Arizona v. Biden, 31 F.4th 469, 480 (6th Cir. 2022).
228
229
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arguably not limited to detention, 236 but also includes “other forms of physical restraint” 237 such as travel restrictions or electronic monitoring, 238 typically imposed
on the noncitizens released from detention notwithstanding their apparent coverage
by § 1226(c). Second, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “[a] well established
tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest
statutes,” and underscored more generally “the deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion, even in the presence of seemingly mandatory legislative commands.” 239 To do otherwise with respect to immigration detention would present
grave implementation difficulties to the executive agencies forced to detain individuals they have strong reason to prefer to leave at liberty, given limited incarcerative
and prosecutorial capacity. The Sixth Circuit focused on this second issue, and also
pointed out that § 1226(c)’s “shall” cannot plausibly be read as absolute, given
§ 1231(a)(2)’s even stronger dictate with respect to a different group of noncitizens
that “[u]nder no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney General
release an alien who has been found inadmissible.” 240 Whichever the theory in support of the flexible interpretation that has guided federal practice since enactment of
§ 1226(c), plenty of room remains for the Rehabilitation Act theory described here.
Indeed, it would constitute disability discrimination to allow flexibility for policy
reasons but bar similar flexibility when required by the Rehabilitation Act theory.

See Matter of Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747 (B.I.A. 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/25/3634.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA79-5GWC] (“[W]e
recognize that both a person who has been released on parole and one who remains incarcerated can
be considered to be in “custody.” On the other hand, the term “detain” generally refers to actual physical restraint or confinement within a given space.”). The Board found that INA section 236(a) did not
intend any such distinction, looking at its legislative history. But the legislative history of section 236(c)
has no similar hints.
237 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 850 (2018).
238 Textually, section 236(c)’s use of “custody” contrasts with references elsewhere in the INA to
“detain” or “detention.” See, e.g., INA § 225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (if an immigration “officer determines at the time” of an initial interview with an alien seeking to enter the United
States “that [the] alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . , the alien shall be detained”); INA §
235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“Any alien subject to the procedures under this
clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not
to have such a fear, until removed.”). INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States. . . .”). Structurally, the interpretation offered here preserves a distinction between section 236(a), which allows release on bond or without conditions, and section
236(c), which insists that (absent a humanitarian situation) ICE maintain “custody”—meaning, according to Jennings, that non-incarceration is allowed only if there are significant restraints on physical
liberty. Likewise, our interpretation maintains the difference between section 236(c) and section 236A,
which more clearly references incarceration, disallowing release under various circumstances and requiring that “detention pursuant to this subsection shall terminate” only if a noncitizen is deemed nonremovable.
239 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760–61 (2005).
240 Arizona v. Biden, 31 F.4th 469, 481 (6th Cir. 2022).
236
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2. Jurisdictional Limits
Four provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) potentially pose
jurisdictional obstacles to the approach just laid out for people in immigration detention. We argue that, under established jurisprudence, none of the four apply to
the claim contemplated in this article. This subpart takes them in turn.

i.

8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) (“the Zipper Clause”) and 1252(a)(5)

In 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), the INA channels claims “arising from any action
taken or proceeding brought to remove” noncitizens into immigration proceedings
before an immigration judge, with appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and
then review by court of appeals. When it applies, the clause forecloses petitions for
habeas corpus and other lawsuits in the district court; the Supreme Court has dubbed
it a “zipper clause,” 241 intended by Congress “to ‘consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.’” 242 Even so, the Supreme Court explained in Jennings v. Rodriguez that the provision has no application
in a case in which the noncitizens “are not asking for review of an order of removal;
they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their
removability will be determined.” 243 In Jennings, six members of the (fractured)
Court held that the provision simply does not cover challenges to ongoing detention
(for example, claims that detention had grown so prolonged as to violate the Due
Process Clause). The three-Justice plurality decision, by Justice Alito, explained that
an unduly broad reading of the words “arising from”—under which § 1252(b)(9)
would bar every claim with any relation to removal—would improperly “make
claims of prolonged detention effectively unreviewable,” and cause “extreme” and
“staggering results” “no sensible person could have intended.” 244 The plurality
wrote, similarly, that “cramming judicial review of” a claim “based on allegedly
inhumane conditions of confinement” into “the review of final removal orders would
be absurd.” 245 Justice Breyer, writing for the three dissenters, argued more comprehensively that only direct challenges to orders of removal were covered. 246 Both

See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001).
See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070 (2020) (quoting and citing St. Cyr, 533
U.S. at 313).
243 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (plurality).
244 Id.
245 Id. at 839–41. See also S. Poverty Law Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-cv-760,
2020 WL 3265533, *14–18 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. S. Poverty L. Ctr. v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 20–5257, 2021 WL 1438297 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 14, 2021); Malam v.
Adducci, No. 20-cv-10829, 2020 WL 1672662, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2020), as amended (Apr. 6,
2020).
246 True, concurring in part and in the judgment, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Gorsuch) disagreed, resting weight on the fact that detention decisions both “congressionally authorized” and
“meant to ensure that an alien can be removed.” The concurrence concluded that the jurisdictional bar
“covers an alien's challenge to the fact of his detention (an action taken in pursuit of the lawful objective
of removal)” though not “claims about inhumane treatment, assaults, or negligently inflicted injuries
suffered during detention (actions that go beyond the Government's lawful pursuit of its removal objective).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 855 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
It is not clear to us which side of this line describes the claim presented in this article—but in any event,
241
242

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4205817

50

Harvard Law & Policy Review

[Vol. 17

before and since Jennings, the courts of appeals have implemented a simple detention/removal distinction: the zipper clause is about challenges to removal, not to
ongoing detention. 247 Thus habeas claims attacking immigration detention decisions
as unduly prolonged 248 are, in fact, commonplace. 249
Here, the Rehabilitation Act claim is that, due to the impacts of immigration
detention, people with disabilities cannot meaningfully participate in bond proceedings. Under Jennings’ analysis, § 1252(b)(9) poses no obstacle; the claim falls
clearly on the detention side of the line. Admittedly, challenges that rest on the right
of disabled people in immigration detention to meaningfully access their removal
proceedings have a causal connection to the underlying removal proceeding. Still,
what is unlawful is the detention, under its actual conditions, and that illegality does
not turn on whether the noncitizen wins or loses the removal case; 250 the relief sought
neither forecloses nor dictates any immigration relief or protection.
Thus, the removal process claim that is the subject of this article is unlike
J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 251 in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that a juvenile’s claims to an
attorney in removal proceedings “arose from” removal proceedings and were barred
from habeas review by § 1252(b)(9). Unlike our theory, J.E.F.M.’s claim had nothing to do with detention. Interpreting § 1252(b)(9) to exempt detention challenges
makes sense because, the Jennings opinions suggest, “[§] 1252(b)(9) is a judicial
channeling provision, not a claim-barring one,” allowing claims that would otherwise escape Article III judicial review to be brought separately. As the Third Circuit
has explained, relying heavily on Jennings, “[t]he point of the provision is to channel
claims into a single petition for review, not to bar claims that do not fit within that
process.” The Third Circuit framed the test as whether the claim is one that must be
asserted “now or never:” whether the noncitizen “seek[s] relief that courts cannot
meaningfully provide alongside review of a final order of removal.” 252 The claim
six justices rejected this approach, both in 2018 in Jennings itself and the next year, in Nielsen v. Preap,
139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (in which all the justices repeated their prior takes).
247 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020); Tazu
v. Att'y Gen. United States, 975 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2020); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't
Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (reading “arising from” “to exclude
claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process” and identifying “challenges
to the legality of detention” as squarely outside § 1252(b)(9)’s scope); Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424
F.3d 42, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that detention claims are independent of removal proceedings
and, thus, not barred by section 1252(b)(9)).
248 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
249 See, e.g., Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434 (3d Cir. 2021).
250 Thus the theory is unlike challenges to conditions of confinement noncitizens have offered to
undermine the validity of their removal orders; such challenges are “inextricably linked to the order of
removal,” Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), and constitute “attempt[s] to reverse the agency's decisions.” Vetcher v. Sessions,
316 F. Supp. 3d 70, 75 (D.D.C. 2018). See also So. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
No. 18-cv-760, 2020 WL 3265533, at *17–18 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. So.
Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 20-5257, 2021 WL 1438297 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 14,
2021); P.L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, No. 1:19-cv-01336, 2019 WL 2568648, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2019).
251 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016).
252 See E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020). See
also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
2007) (explaining that § 1252(b)(9) does not reach “claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral
to, the removal process,” like “claims that cannot effectively be handled through the available administrative process”); Gicharu v. Carr, 983 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2020) (same).
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here fits this analysis to a T: without access to a collateral proceeding, as through an
injunctive or habeas action, a person in pre-order immigration detention cannot obtain meaningful review of the Rehabilitation Act claim we describe; waiting until a
petition for review would prolong the period discriminatory detention by months or
even years. 253
Similarly, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) poses no bar. Under this “exclusive means of
review” provision, “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals
in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial
review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter,
except as provided in subsection (e).” But it is evident from the text and established
in case law that (a)(5) does “not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention
that are independent of challenges to removal orders.” 254 Here, the relief contemplated is unrelated to any immigration outcome. Determining whether a challenge is
independent “will turn on the substance of the relief that a plaintiff is seeking.” 255

ii.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

A second INA provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), strips district court jurisdiction
over “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter” (emphasis added) The Supreme Court has made clear that italicized words mean what they say:
We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to “arise from” the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves. 256
Decisions to use pre-order detention do not “commence proceedings,” “adjudicate
cases” or “execute removal orders,” so § 1252(g) has no application.

iii.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)

A final INA provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f), deprives any court “(other than the
Supreme Court)” of “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of

253 If a disabled noncitizen was deprived of meaningful access to his immigration proceedings
because of his disability, and lost his claim for protection or relief for that reason, he might, however,
be able to seek review of that immigration claim in a PFR, alleging a Rehabilitation Act violation. Of
course this could not cure unlawful detention, because such detention already took place.
254 See Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Gbotoe v. Jennings, No.
17-cv-06819-WHA, 2017 WL 6039713, *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017).
255 Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Delgado v. Quarantillo,
643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011). The analysis in Southern Poverty Law Center v. United States Dep't of
Homeland Security, No. 18-cv-760, 2022 WL 1801150, at *6 (D.D.C. June 2, 2022), is slightly different—and slightly worse for our argument. There, the district court barred Fifth Amendment access-tocounsel claims that, it said, revolved entirely around the conditions' effects on Fifth Amendment rights
as to removal proceedings, but allowed access-to-counsel claims related to bond or non-immigration
proceedings.
256 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999)).
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the provisions of Part IV of this subchapter, . . . other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under
such part have been initiated.” The Supreme Court has noted that this language “prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief . . ., but specifies that
this ban does not extend to individual cases.” 257Moreover, it may not prohibit classwide declaratory relief. 258
CONCLUSION
When pretrial incarceration discriminates against individuals with disabilities,
unequally undermining their access to their criminal or immigration cases without a
persuasive public safety need, federal antidiscrimination law requires their release.
The precise argument we have made is novel, but it rests solidly on existing statutory
and regulatory provisions, and their judicial elaboration. We have, ourselves,
worked several times with people in pretrial incarceration to raise the argument, with
good (though not precedential) results. We conclude with our hope that many more
legal practitioners—including individuals representing themselves—will use and
build on our argument to mitigate the injury unnecessary pretrial incarceration is,
right now, causing thousands of people with disabilities, harming their health and
livelihoods and their access to the legal processes that purport to justify their incarceration.

Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 481–82.
See Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2065 n.2 (2022); id. at 2077–78 (2022)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
257
258

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4205817

